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ABSTRACT

The Fall of Rome (or more specifically the Western Roman Empire) remains a hotly debated
subject in the history of Late Antiquity. The Battle of Adrianople can be argued to be the
beginning of Rome’s end, but the cause of the battle lay more with Rome’s imperial
mismanagement than any deliberate attempt at war from the barbarians. Rome turned against
those who would have defended the empire, and for many centuries had done just that. Despite
being forced into an antagonistic relationship with Rome, their reputation as the cause of Rome’s
calamity has remained to the present day. This thesis will first argue that the fault lies more with
Rome than with the various barbarian tribes. After making that argument, it will investigate why
the “barbarian invader” myth has remained in the public consciousness for more than 1500 years
after Rome’s fall.
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TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

•

753 B.C.E., mythical founding of Rome

•

509 B.C.E., beginning of the Roman Republic

•

390 B.C.E., Battle of the Allia and the Sack of Rome

•

264-241 B.C.E., First Punic War

•

218-201 B.C.E., Second Punic War
o 216 B.C.E., Battle of Cannae

•

58-50 B.C.E., Caesar’s Gallic Campaign

•

31 B.C.E., Battle of Actium and common date for the start of the Roman Empire

•

9 B.C.E., Battle of Teutoburg Forest

•

376-382 C.E., The Gothic War
o 376 C.E., Danube Crossing by the Goths
o 378 C.E., Battle of Adrianople
o 379 C.E., Theodosius named Augustus

•

395 C.E., Death of Theodosius I

•

406 C.E., Death of Stilicho

•

410 C.E., Sack of Rome by Alaric and the Visigoths

•

451 C.E., Battle of the Catalaunian Fields

•

455 C.E., Sack of Rome by Genseric and the Vandals

•

476 C.E., Romulus Augustulus deposed by Odacer and common date for the end of the
Roman Empire
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INTRODUCTION

By the fourth century C.E., Rome encompassed the whole of the Mediterranean. It had been the
master of the Western world for more than five hundred years, and an estimated fifty to sixty
million people lived under Roman law. 1 With such a large land mass and population, combined
with ancient methods of travel and communication, identity becomes a question worth asking.
Because of the trade flow, and the multi-cultural nature of the empire, peoples like the barbarians
beyond the Rhine and Danube actually operated on a daily basis in a very Roman way. These
individuals were essential to Roman institutions, even the defense of the empire, yet for centuries
they have shouldered the blame for Rome’s Fall.
By investigating the period of Late Antiquity, the argument can be made that Rome itself
was to blame for its doom, in creating enemies where there were none. Warfare and invasions
may have occurred in the fifth century, but it was the failure of Roman policy in the fourth
century that caused those events. Most directly, Rome failed to recognize its willing subjects to
the north, and instead turned them into enemies.
While Rome failed to incorporate the barbarian tribes into the Roman system, the
historical record and popular memory have largely focused on the barbarian’s role in the empire
coming to an end. Until recently, the standard understanding of Rome’s final years was one of
chaos and destruction brought about by Germanic invaders. This thesis will focus on two aspects

1

Mary Beard, S.P.Q.R: A History of Ancient Rome. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015). 440

1

of the Roman and barbarian relationship, how the Romans viewed the barbarians during their
time and how that memory has lasted until the present. The period before and after the pivotal
battle of Adrianople (378 C.E.) will be the primary setting of the argument, as after the Gothic
War in the fourth century, Rome never recovered.
Any discussion on the Fall of Rome is a perilous undertaking for a scholar. The field is
rife with opposing positions, painstakingly researched work, and fierce defenses. The discussion
on Rome’s collapse has fallen largely into two camps. The first school of thought focuses on a
Europe that went through a transformation as Rome’s presence decreased and eventually made
an exit from the world stage. Transformation is championed by Lynn White Jr., Peter Brown,
and Guy Halsall. The other (led by Peter Heather) argues that while Rome’s fall may have not
been the dramatic event it was believed to be in earlier centuries, it nevertheless occurred, was
military in nature, and was indeed dramatic for the course of European history.
These two positions need not be so opposed. As Adrian Goldsworthy says, “The Western
Roman Empire ceased to exist in the fifth century.” 2 There can be no substantial argument to the
contrary. Regardless of any transformation within the region, from a military and political
viewpoint, the Roman West no longer existed as a political entity. At its end sat a foreign army,
with which Rome could not contend. Yet that fact does not mean that discussions and debates on
transformation are in error; quite the contrary.
Halsall and Heather hotly disagree with one another, but even Halsall states, “The Roman
Empire did come to an end, admittedly at different times in different places, and when it did so

Adrian Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower (New Haven & London: Yale University Press,
2009). 405.

2
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people noticed.” 3 This debate between decline and fall or transformation largely revolves around
the place of the various “Germanic” peoples in the narrative (a title that has been hotly argued
against, and is most often be replaced with “barbarian” — a term having its own baggage). I
agree with Halsall that the barbarian migrations were unintended, and I place the blame squarely
at the feet of imperial mismanagement, that if properly implemented could have seen a boom in
the Roman population. 4 Instead, it allowed misplaced identity politics to create discord and
eventually a dramatic shift in positions on both sides. Even returning to the political and military
standpoint, Heather points out that the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410 C.E. was one of the “most
civilized sacks of a city ever witnessed.” 5
Alaric’s sack of Rome was not the end of the Western Empire, but it does show the
combination of these two approaches. Foreign militaries were operating within Roman territory,
and Rome was unable to stop them. It also shows, however, that these “barbarians” were not so
barbarous. The slow transformation and cross-pollination of cultures meant that Alaric was not
some wild-haired marauder. He even attempted to avoid sacking the city in the first place, and
then ordered his men not to destroy the ancient capital after deciding the attack was necessary.
To make this argument, this first chapter will look at the situation leading to Adrianople,
a largely avoidable event. The chapter will look at the role of the barbarian in Roman society,
and clarify how the Romans saw themselves as well as the “other.” Chapter two will be a
discussion of the Battle of Adrianople and its aftermath. With the death of Valens on the
battlefield, was Rome able to recover? Theodosius is viewed as a successful emperor, largely

3
Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376-568 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007). 21.
4
Ibid. 22.
5
Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 228.
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because he kept the Empire together following the Gothic War, but his reputation is misleading.
The period after Adrianople was a gilded one. Going into the fifth century, Rome appeared to be
every bit as powerful, but the foundation was crumbling [Figure 1].

Figure 1: Rome in the 5th Century 6

After explaining that the barbarians were largely victims of Roman mismanagement and
forced into war, the final chapter will discuss why the barbarians have been publicly remembered
so differently. Despite the various approaches to Late Antiquity by the likes of Brown, WardPerkins, Heather, Halsall, and many others, the stigma of the barbarian invader seems difficult to
shake off. While these historians do not always concur, they do align on the point that a barbaric,
“Germanic” horde causing the fall of Rome is more myth than fact. By looking at various
periods throughout Western history, we will trace the continuation of the barbarian myth in

Alen S. “Emperor Theodosius and Final Division of the Roman Empire.” ShortHistory.org (Accessed December
15, 2019).
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writing, popular culture, and language to uncover why the barbarian tribes of the fourth and fifth
centuries cannot shed their undeserved reputations.
It must be pointed out that the questions asked by historians are commonly reflective of
their own periods of history and of their own life experiences. Modernity has seen a constant
struggle with the questions of identity and ethnicity, with no signs of slowing down. While this
work attempts to decipher the role played by barbarian peoples in Roman society, many Western
nations are again facing issues of racial conflict, minority rights, and the best way to incorporate
(or exclude) immigrants vis-a-vis their societies. A prime example of why these questions
should be asked can be seen consistently in the nightly news.
In this thesis I will argue that Rome’s xenophobic attitude towards the northern
barbarians created an enemy that should have been an ally. Their memory remains stained until
the present day. While I make this argument, western countries are again facing questions of
integration. While the United States debates building a wall along its southern border, and how
to integrate or expel millions of people, United States Army veteran Miguel Perez is being
deported to Mexico after years of service, including multiple combat deployments. 7 Similar to
Rome, policies and actions that create enemies out of allies cripple the foundations of the
country. The issues facing modernity and antiquity will always differ. While no definitive
answers to today’s problems can be found in the ancient record, lessons about what actions and
policies to avoid are abundantly available. The absurdity of turning against those willing and
able to defend your way of life should certainly be one of those lessons.

CBS News, “U.S. Army Veteran Who Served Two Tours in Afghanistan Deported to Mexico.” Origninally
published March 26, 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-army-veteran-miguel-perez-deported-to-mexico/
7
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CHAPTER 1-THE COMING STORM: THE ROAD TO ADRIANOPLE

For scholars who view the period as more of a transition, the Gothic crossing of the Danube in
376 C.E. is seen as the beginning of the Migration Period. For those who see the ensuing period
as the Fall of Rome, the Goths crossing into Roman territory was the beginning of the end.
Regardless of the scholar’s stand on the historiographical debate, there is no doubt that 376
represents a pivotal period in the history of Ancient Rome.
This chapter will explain the various political and military issues facing Rome leading to
the Gothic crossing. In the west, Valentinian focused on the Roman limes, and defending the
frontier. When Valentinian unexpectedly died, the ensuing power struggle cost the life of one of
Rome’s best generals. In the east, the emperor Valens was saddled with the responsibility of
dealing with the Sassanid Empire and the fallout from his predecessor Julian’s failed military
campaign. In the midst of these struggles, the Goths requested asylum to escape pressure from
the Huns.
Once the setting has been suitably established, the chapter will transition to the role of
barbarians in late Roman society. It will show that the barbarian request for Roman asylum was
consistent with previous interactions between the two groups. It will also examine the mutually
beneficial nature of the existing relationship. By explaining the events surrounding the Danube
crossing and the existing relationship between Rome and the barbarians, the argument will be
made that Rome’s impending disaster was both avoidable and of its own creation.

6

The Road to Adrianople: The West

The Roman Empire in Late Antiquity stretched from Britain to the Middle East. With so much
land mass, command and control became a constant problem for Rome’s emperors. To set the
stage, let us look at the multiple pressing situations during the late fourth century, moving us
closer to Adrianople. The epoch shows multiple problem areas for imperial rule, and a
consistent failure of the imperial court to deal with these issues, starting with senior the senior
Augustus Valentinian’s snobbish and irrational dealings along the Rhine, Danube, and North
Africa.
A consistent struggle for historians is the period in which to begin the narrative. Events
prior to their chosen starting point always affect the circumstances they discuss. This narrative
will survey a brief period only, in an effort to be as concise as possible in describing events. The
construction of fortifications on the far side of the Rhine in the spring of 369 C.E. seems as good
a place as any to begin. Our primary source for this time period is Ammianus Marcellinus. Born
in Antioch around 330 C.E., in the twilight years of Constantine the Great, 8 he describes himself
as a Greek soldier who wrote a history from Nerva to the Gothic War. 9 His admiration of Julian
is palpable, and his mild annoyance with Christianity (and to be fair, of religion in general it
seems) must be considered when he condemned the later emperors. In addition, his experience
as a soldier and his willingness to discuss social and economic issues should serve as a defense
of his knowledge base.

8
9

Marcellinus Introduction. 14.
Ammianus Marcellinus. History: Books 27-3 (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library 1939). 31.16.
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As Ammianus said, “Valentinian from the very beginning of his reign was burning with a
glorious resolve to protect his frontiers.” 10 The last senior Augustus to rule out of the Western
Empire, Valentinian was an interesting character. Heather recounts that Symmachus, a Roman
senator who had gone before Valentinian’s court at the Northern Front, praised him to his brother
Valens for essentially leaving a relaxing life in the Eastern Empire, to take up the old Roman
standard of military conquest in the West. 11
The 350’s C.E. had seen Emperor Julian defend the Rhine and Danube against the
Alamans and the Burgundians. 12 Ammianus even had his moment of glory at the Battle of
Strasbourg in 357 C.E. while serving under Julian, who was not yet a full Augustus. 13
Valentinian also fought with the Alamanni, even attempting to convince the Burgundians to
attack them with Roman support. 14
Valentinian’s Alamannic War lasted from 368–374 C.E., and it saw him endeavor to
construct fortifications on the far side of the Rhine and on the Danube’s borders. Each of these
attempts proved fruitless, and increased hostilities between the barbarians and the Romans.
Largely uneventful, the war was characterized by “one significant (if lucky) victory.” 15 It is
largely remembered more for the peace made in the middle of the river than for any actual battle,
and the end of the Alamanni as a threat to Rome.

Ibid 29.6 pg. 383
Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire. 42.
12
C.R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore and London: John
Hopkins University Press, 1994). 134.
13
Marcellinus, 11.12, 105.
14
Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West. 149.
15
Ibid. 174.
10
11
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However, many lessons can be gleaned from these events. First, we see the way Rome
dealt with its neighbors: encroaching on foreign soil without regard to boundaries. Valentinian
faced opposition for his plan to build on the far side of the Rhine, and subsequently attempting
the same across the Danube. The Romans clearly had no issue with using past enemies as
current allies, as shown by their use of the Burgundians to attack their Alamannic neighbors. A
clear lack of cooperation between the various tribes across the Rhine is also discernable, as the
Burgundians considered attacking the tribe with which they had previously allied against
Julian. 16 The final point to be taken from this event is the political deftness of the Burgundians in
dealing with the Romans. While willing to attack, they declined to engage without a Roman
guarantee.
On a broader front, many issues were facing Rome. Before transitioning to Valens in the
East, we must consider the scandals and issues taking place in the West that were not centered
around the Northern border. One example is, the absolute failure of Valentinian’s policies to
deal with Rome’s difficulties.
Valentinian had an outstanding lieutenant in Theodosius the Elder. His first task was to
recover the lands lost in the barbarica conspiratio in Roman Britain. While dealing with the
traitor Valentinus, Theodosius had to set the province to rights after a rebellion along Hadrian’s
Wall that allowed the tribes north of it to move south. 17 After handling the situation in Britannia,
Theodosius was recalled to court and elevated to command the cavalry. 18 In this position he

Marcellinus 28.5. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West. 149.
Marcellinus 28.3.
18
Ibid 28.3.
16
17

9

fought against the Alemanni and the Sarmatians before being sent to deal with conspiracy and
treachery in North Africa.
In Africa, Theodosius was sent to address an uprising by Firmus, against the Roman
regent Romanus. Valentinian tried to decipher the situation, at which point Ammianus stated
that Romanus “misled Valentinian by a wicked lie.” 19 Valentinian was deceived into believing
others to be at fault, and he ordered their execution. When the situation persisted, Valentinian
sent Theodosius to ascertain what was going on with Romanus and Firmus. Theodosius found
Firmus willing to negotiate, as he had acted only against the treacherous Romanus. Romanus
was found to be guilty after Theodosius’s investigation. Yet Firmus was not allowed to return to
the fold. Reasonable cause or not, Valentinian would not allow discord or rebellion. Further
throwing salt in the wound, and despite all he had done for the Empire, Theodosius was executed
during the power vacuum following Valentinian’s death. 20
The final drama for the Western Empire came from the sudden and unexpected death of
Valentinian. The Quadi petitioned him for an audience, requesting amnesty for past
transgressions and being willing to offer service to the Roman state if their request was
granted. 21 While it was not in Valentinian’s nature or custom to grant personal audiences, he
acquiesced at the prospect of new allies. At the meeting, the Quadi acted humbly, but they
essentially explained to the emperor that they felt their hostilities had been reasonable, due to the
building of fortifications in their territory. They further pointed out that they would uphold the
peace, although they were a confederation of peoples and did not speak for the entire group.

Ibid 28.6.
Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire. 254.
21
Marcellinus 30.6.
19
20
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Valentinian’s enraged response cost him his life, as he fell dead from a stroke in the middle of
his tirade.
Valentinian was succeeded to the purple by his son Gratian, who had already been made
Augustus by Valentinian I. The general Merobaudes, however, decided to install Gratian’s fouryear-old brother, Valentinian II, as emperor. 22 In the ensuing power grab, Theodosius the Elder
met his fate. There was certainly fear of a civil war to contest the appointment, but Gratian,
realizing his position, acquiesced easily to the concept of shared rule. Killing a general of
Theodosius’ caliber would haunt the empire after Adrianople. His death indicates that power
hungry administrators were far more interested in securing their own place of power, than doing
what was best for Rome as a whole.
So stood the position of the Western Empire. War on the Rhine and Danube had
occurred off and on for the better part of two decades, constantly plugging up the gaps of
rebellion and treachery in Britannia, in Africa, and in the heart of the Western Empire itself.
Allies rebelled against corrupt administrators and then were punished for doing so, even after the
corruption was proven. An emperor died in his prime, succeeded by a weak son and a near
infant. To top it off, the greatest champion of the West had been executed during the transition.
In the Eastern Empire, the situation was no better.
The Road to Adrianople: The East

In the Eastern Roman Empire, the Emperor Valens faced a situation not much better than his
brother in the West. Having been appointed the Eastern Emperor in 364 C.E. by his brother,

22

Ibid 30.10
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Valentinian I, Valens inherited the turmoil with Rome’s Sassanid rival, Shapur II, left by Julian
the Apostate’s failed invasion of 363 C.E. 23 Before he could face his eastern rival, however,
Valens had to deal with an early revolt by Procopius.
Born in Cilicia, Procopius was a relative of the Emperor Julian. 24 Ammianus believed
that the elevation of Jovian following Julian’s death in the east, combined with a rumor that on
his deathbed Julian had stated his wish for Procopius to take his place, caused concern for
Procopius. 25 Procopius went into hiding to avoid execution. Jovian died on his way to
Constantinople, which elevated Valentinian, and subsequently Valens, to the purple. Hearing
that Gothic tribes were crossing into Thrace, Valens sent two legions ahead to quell the situation.
While the legions were passing through Constantinople, Procopius entreated them to join his
cause of usurpation.
With his claim made public, and a small force to back him up, Procopius began to
consider how best to deal with Valens when he came to squash this little rebellion. He decided
to ask the Goths to assist him in his goal. Procopius saw this as a chance to gain the upper hand
against Valens, and the Goths saw an opportunity to gain an ally on the imperial throne, hoping
to reverse some of the harsher restrictions placed on them by the treaty with Constantine in 332
C.E. 26
Neither group was successful in their goal. Procopius was defeated at Thyatira (366
C.E.) near Nacoleia, before being betrayed from within and handed over to Valens. Procopius

Marcellinus 25.3 for the death of Julian, 26.1-2 for the accession of Valentinian, and 26.4 for the choosing of
Valens as the co-emperor.
24
Marcellinus 26.6.
25
Ibid 26.6.
26
Peter Heather, Goths and Romans 332-489 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 61.
23
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was immediately beheaded, and then the men who had brought him before the Emperor were
also put to the sword. 27 The Goths, specifically the Tervingi, were then wrapped up in a war
with Valens, from 367-369 C.E. While Valens did find some success, the Tervingi were able to
avoid a decisive defeat, and the matter ended when Valens once again faced trouble in the East. 28
For a while the Goths had been quiet. Upon returning to the stage, however, they would
never again leave the Roman narrative. Peace was made with the Gothic Chieftain Athanaric,
after “the interruption of trade had reduced the barbarians to such want that they sent a number
of delegations to beg for pardon and peace.” 29 Amusingly, when Valens agreed, Athanaric
refused to enter Roman territory because of an oath he had previously taken not to enter Roman
territory; therefore, a mid-river peace agreement was made between Valens and the chief. This
is an example of the the cross-pollination between the Roman and Gothic cultures. Roman trade
had become so integral to Gothic society that the extension of a war was thought to be too
damaging. Even without a clear and decisive victory, the barbarians could not sustain the strain
on their economy. We also see the Roman nature of Athanaric’s political maneuvering, in not
being willing to cross the river and attempting to convince Valens to be the lesser sovereign and
cross over to him. Even though a neutral ground was established, it is hard to imagine an earlier
Augustus being willing to make a similar gesture.
Part of the reason Valens had allowed this peace to take place was a growing dispute over
Armenia. Shapur had faced pressing matters in the eastern section of his own kingdom, and to
free himself from western worry, he had come to a settlement with Valens on the Armenian

Marcellinus 26.9 pg. 331
Heather, The Goths. 62.
29
Marcellinus 27.9.
27
28
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question. The main problem centered around the appointed king of Armenia, Pap. According to
Ammianus, some men in the region had created exaggerated claims about the young Pap. 30 The
discontent was enough for Valens to hatch a plot to capture and kill him. Although the first
attempt was botched, Valens eventually had the young royal assassinated.
This event did not sit well with Shapur. While he had agreed to allow Armenia to remain
neutral with a Roman slant, he saw the recent assassination of the king as an excuse to initiate
conflict with his rivals again. Valens responded by sending an envoy with a message essentially
chastising Shapur, stating that “it was criminal in a king who prided himself on being upright and
content with his own possessions to covet Armenia.” 31 To make matters worse, the envoys also
took into their protection a number of Armenian areas who had requested it. Naturally, the
message did not go over smoothly, and Valens once again prepared for war with the East.
The preparations for war meant taking men from the Danube region (which, as previously
noted, had been a hot spot of activity). At this time, the Goths requested asylum in Roman
territory because of the threat of the Huns. While more events took place in the Eastern Empire,
these demonstrate the strain placed on the purple since Valens had taken the throne. He was
constantly crossing from one side of his territory to the other. He first fought a usurpation,
conducted a punitive campaign against a portion of the Goths, dealt with the question of
Armenia, and his rival in Persia more than once (not to mention the events of the West which he
had dealt with as well). The request of the Goths for asylum was at first seen as a golden
opportunity by Valens, as it offered the ability to close the gap in the frontier that the transfer of

30
31

Marcellinus 30.1.
Ibid 30.2.
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troops to the East had created. The new Gothic immigrants would be a strong source of troop
recruitment. As we shall see, however, the situation quickly turned sour.
The Road to Adrianople: The Migration Period Begins

When the request for resettlement was made Valens looked at the various sub-tribes to ascertain
which of the groups would be most beneficial to his purposes. The Tervingi were chosen
specifically, their leader; Fritigern had been a rival of Athanaric, and had previously allied with
Valens against him. 32 This event was a somewhat common practice. Heather cites records of
100,000 people migrating from North of the Danube into Thrace under Nero, and a later example
of Dacians being settled in the empire around 300 C.E. 33 Halsall posits that the situation may
not have been as necessary as other scholars have argued. It was true that Valens was preparing
for a campaign in the east, and that his best troops were stationed there. It is also true that the
Goths were currently under friendly terms with the Romans, and that the Danube defenses “were
strong and well manned.” 34 This was a desired outcome, encompassing troop levies, new taxes,
and the incorporation into the empire of an old enemy. Heather even points out that the majority
of ancient sources approve of Valens’ actions, with such agreement being an anomaly. 35 Even
the more critical tongue of Ammianus stated with the knowledge of events to come, “None of
those destined to overthrow the Roman Empire should be left behind.” 36

Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 174-175.
Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire. 159.
34
Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West. 176.
35
Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire. 158.
36
Marcellinus 31.4. Of further note, even with his critical tongue, Marcellinus at first points out the possibilities of
such a union. Having heard constant rumors of a terrible people to the North, he thought the combination of the
Gothic immigrants would provide substantial help. He states that the matter seemed one for “rejoicing,” recognizing
the new recruiting pool combined with a levy of gold to be paid to the emperor when such troops could not be
mustered. Having written towards the end of the 4th century, it should be noted, however, how he viewed the
32
33
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Events turned sour solely due to Imperial mismanagement of the situation. The two men
in charge of the Gothic crossing were Lupicinus and Maximus. Lupicinus was the commander in
Thrace, with his headquarters in Marcianopolis, and Ammianus describes Maximus as “a
disastrous general” and condemned them both for being “equally reckless.” 37 Valens had ordered
that the Goths be given safe passage and food. 38 Either through underestimation of the size of
the group or a purposeful refusal to follow these orders, the food supply for the barbarians began
to run short. The Goths were forced to sell themselves and their children into slavery just for the
prospect of food. Halsall says the supposed rate for dog meat was “one child for one dog.” 39
Lupicinus both profited from this situation and decided to escalate it even more.
Lupicinus next used his forces to push the unsettled Goths to a second camp. Since
Valens had only permitted the Tervingi to cross, the Greuthungi had been forced to watch and
wait. The expectation was likely that Valens knew Fritigern, and due to the friendly nature of
the two, the Tervingi would be brought into the empire, separated, and brought into the Roman
fold. Then the Romans, now supplied with fresh troops, would return for the second group.
Watching the situation unfold, however, the Greuthungi decided to cross on their own while the
Romans attention was occupied with the first settlers. 40

ensuing events. He argued that they “led to the destruction of the Roman World.” Being a military man, he likely
defined events around battles won and lost, but this is an important note to be remembered in the argument of
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In this difficult situation, Lupicinus decided to make a move against the Gothic
leadership. He invited the Gothic chiefs to a banquet in their honor, and then seized them while
there. 41 The attempt was botched, but some of the leaders were taken and others killed. Among
those captured was Fritigern.
As one could expect, when people already distraught are pushed even further, they erupt.
Reading the situation well, Fritigern offered to go outside to the people and calm them. 42
Lupicinus thought this to be a good idea, and in an astonishing move, he allowed him to do so, at
which point Fritigern fled and began to plan for military action.
Halsall’s determination is that the Danube force was strong enough to keep out the Goths
but was not strong enough to deal with the multi-layered situation of allowing some in and
keeping others out, along with disarmament and resettlement. 43 It appears that the Roman army
on the Danube was strong enough for friendly operations, but not for direct action. The Roman
force appears to be the only one in the region as well. After the Goths defeated Lupicinus and
began to roam the countryside freely, it was nearly two years before Valens could respond to the
issue in 378 C.E. (a fact that his people were sure to remind him of, and a likely reason he
decided against waiting for Gratian at Adrianople). To be fair to Valens, his concern for his
eastern border after renewed aggression towards the Sassanids was reasonable, but Lupicinus
should have shown restraint. Even if for no other reason than the lack of reinforcements.
The Roman official may be scorned for his misconduct and could arguably be as
responsible for the later fate of the empire as any single individual, but recall that in North Africa
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Romanus had acted in a similar fashion. He had mistreated his people, abused his office, and
lied to Valentinian. Yet when Theodosius the Elder was sent to deal with the crisis, the rebel
Firmus, who was willing to come to terms if Romanus’s abuses were handled, was condemned
regardless of circumstance.
Even if we extend this analysis to Lupicinus’s attempt to assassinate the Gothic
leadership, we see that it holds steady for imperial policy. Was not the reason for renewed
hostility with the Sassanids the assassination of the Armenian Prince Pap? Heather even
postulates that Lupicinus’s actions may have been imperial policy. 44 Valens would have been
well aware of the situation and may not have been as excited about the recent Gothic arrivals as
first believed. Heather also mentions that this may have been the reason for the assassination
attempt being so botched. Perhaps Lupicinus lost his nerve, realizing the forces he had at his
disposal and knowing the large number of potential enemies he was about to make. 45 This
would also help explain why he allowed Fritigern to be released, perhaps hoping that such an act
would calm the storm to which he was not yet willing to commit. It may even show how
disconnected from the situation the Romans on the scene, and particularly Lupicinus, were from
the realities of the situation.
Before looking at the battle of Adrianople, the next section will expand on the
interactions between the Romans and their northern neighbors. It will show that the barbarian
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request for Roman asylum was consistent with previous interactions between the two groups. It
will examine the mutually beneficial nature of the relationship, to further highlight the point that
Rome’s impending disaster was its own creation.
Neighbors or Enemies?

Before moving on to the battle of Adrianople, it is important to examine the relationship that
existed between the barbarians and the Romans prior to the events of 376 C.E. How the two
groups saw themselves and each other is complex. As with all cases of identity and ethnicity, the
answer is much deeper than surface level. As citizenship was expanded, Roman identity in Late
Antiquity was largely defined by the ways of the Roman ancestors. 46 This would imply that “the
other,” integral to the definition of self, would be those whose ancestors and customs were not
Roman.
Rome has long been painted as a society that welcomed outsiders, and from the city’s
earliest stories it was portrayed as a melting pot of cultures. Mythical descendant of the Trojan
exile Aeneas, Romulus founded Rome in 753 B.C.E. In an effort to expand its population, the
new city welcomed all comers, becoming a sort of “asylum” for outcasts. 47 In another legend,
the Sabine women were stolen by the Romans because no women would migrate to a city of
villains, and they eventually intervened in the war between their husbands and fathers. 48 During
Rome’s expansion, its citizens would entreat their enemies’ deities to abandon their devotees and
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join the Roman pantheon. Even after Rome became the supreme Mediterranean authority,
ancient enemies such as the Gauls began to be absorbed into its fold.
For every example of Roman inclusion, however, there are two examples for exclusion.
As Cicero said in the first century B.C.E, Cato “talks as if he were in the Republic of Plato, when
in fact he is in the crap of Romulus.” 49 The asylum for outsiders was created because no other
groups of men would willingly join Romulus. The Sabine women were forced into marriage
after being abducted and realized the difficulties they faced if their husbands, fathers, and
brothers killed each other. Foreign deities were entreated to help ensure victory. Carthage was
purposely crippled for its’ rivalry with Rome in the Punic Wars (264-146 B.C.E). The Social
War (91-88 B.C.E.) was fought due to Rome’s refusal to grant Italians, Roman citizenship. Even
Caracalla’s gift of citizenship (the Constitutio Antoniniana 212 C.E.) to all free men of the
Empire was more about political advantage and expanded taxation than any high-minded concept
of inclusion. 50 Much like the United States’ own claim to be a melting pot, while having a
history littered with policies of exclusion, Rome’s mythical portrayal does not hold up.
How then were the barbarian tribes across the Danube and Rhine rivers defined? Were
they viewed as being similar to the Romans, with whom they traded, fought in armies, and
served in governmental systems? Or were they viewed as being different because of a lack of
shared history, common language, or a variance in belief systems? The answer is both.
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The concept of the Germanic tribes and how they are represented are defined by the
Romans, as the written sources that remain are only Roman. 51 One must return to the concept of
the “other.” With a vast Empire covering so many types of people, it was difficult to have a
clearly defined “other” to reflect against. In its history, Rome had always created an “other” to
contend with, in the form of an enemy to unite against. The early Romans faced the Etruscans,
the Samnites, and other Latin tribes, and the mid-Republic saw the great rivalry with Carthage.
The late Republic and early Empire created a situation pitting Romans against each other,
establishing the “other” based on distinct political differences. When Augustus established the
Principate, however, many of Rome’s old enemies had vanished. This is not to argue that the
Romans became peaceful, only that they needed to discover new enemies to fight. No longer
imminent threats to Roman survival, these enemies were isolated “threats” on the far-flung
frontiers of the empire (in Britannia or across the Rhine and Danube) or posed no immediate
threat to Rome’s survival (Parthian Empire).
Despite the lack of an immediate threat, the northern frontiers would consistently remain
a thorn in Rome’s side. The name “Germania” was given to the region by Rome, and the largest
lens in which to view these peoples of Northern Europe comes from Roman authors. Tacitus
wrote an ethnography about the peoples across the Rhine and Danube. The men of “wild blue
eyes, reddish hair and huge frames” who “excel only in violent effort” has become the distinctive
vision of the barbarians of the north. 52 Tacitus was inspired by Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis
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Historia (Natural History) and a twenty-volume series on the Wars in Germany. 53 According to
Goffart, however, no other contemporary author paints the barbarians the way Tacitus did. 54
Pliny’s encyclopedic account of the land beyond the Danube is mythological as he described a
race called the “Hyperboreans,” who lived in a utopian society where “all disharmony and
sorrow are unknown.” 55
While Tacitus’ account appears more grounded, an important distinction is the difference
between Tacitus’ Germani and the various tribes across the Rhine and Danube in Late Antiquity.
As Halsall points out, “Any similarities between Ammianus’ brief accounts of the trans-Rhenan
barbarians and those of Tacitus must be seen in the context of the former’s desire to be seen as
the latter’s continuator.” 56
“Barbarian” was a term for a large variety of tribes and peoples living beyond the realm
of Roman control. While the term is used liberally in both ancient and modern sources, it cannot
be overstated that it largely represents the “other.” Identity of self, and the self’s relation to the
other appears to be a crucial point of interest to the Romans. Dench points out that “few
‘Roman’ myths do not relate directly to issues of origins between Rome and her neighbors.” 57
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At first a Greek concept, the idea of the barbarian passed to the Romans with their obsessive
fascination of all things Greek.
The Greek term can be traced as far back as Homer, and it essentially means “speaking
barbarian” or “babbling.” 58 The trouble comes with the flexibility of the word’s definition
depending on who and why it was being used. Within ancient sources, the term could be used
malleably and did not necessarily represent the core expression of an individual or a people. A
tribesperson from across the border may be a barbarian, but he could also be a Frank known for
ferocity (in a negative context) or for fortitude (in a positive one). 59
Much like the Gallic menace that had threatened the early Romans, the tribes beyond the
Rhine and Danube became the new bogeymen of the empire. As is so often the case, the first
real interactions between Rome and the barbarians of the north were military in nature. The first
mention of the German tribes in the sources are when the Cimbri and Teutones began moving
south into Gallic lands, causing massive Roman defeats at the battles of Noreia (112 B.C.E) and
of Arausio (105 B.C.E). Gaius Marius was then given the task of dealing with the Cimbri, due to
his victory over Jugurtha. 60
During Caesar’s campaign in Gaul (58-50 B.C.E), he gives our next glimpse at the
barbarians across the Rhine. In Book VI of his Gallic Campaign, Caesar gave a brief description
of the Germans: “Their whole life is spent on hunting and military pursuits.” 61 The largest
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defeat of the early Empire was that of the Teutoburg Forest (9 B.C.E). After the disaster,
Augustus would cry out for his lost legions, and Tiberius would have to redirect his efforts back
to Germania. The empire never fully conquered the region, even after the extended period of
warfare in the Marcomannic Wars in the second century C.E. Throughout the entire history of
the empire, the northern menace continued to plague Rome. But was there ever really a menace
at all?
The primary reason for not conquering the territory we know as Germany was that it
simply was not worth it. To the Romans, two concerns were always uppermost in their minds,
grain and manpower. The Empire’s massive population demanded a proportionally massive
amount of food. Any army would similarly require abundant provisions to maintain their
effectiveness. As Procopius observed, “The outcome of war depends largely on provisions.” 62
Germania, however, was not a well-established region during the time of the empire, it would not
have been able to supply a reasonable amount of grain, and the lack of communities meant that
little material wealth existed. What then would a Roman conqueror have to gain? The cost of
war would be higher than the potential returns.
By the third century, offensive warfare for Roman conquest had largely died, when “it
became all too apparent that the fruits of conquest—usually measured in terms of the glory
generated for individual rulers rather than any rational, strategically minded cost-benefit
equation—ceased to be worth the effort.” 63 In the Rhine and the Danube regions (and far
beyond) clan chieftains were more than willing to trade German men for Roman goods,
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currency, tools, and other objects. Even in regions traditionally not thought of as having Roman
interaction were flooded with such methods of payment.
The ever-present need for manpower was the one aspect of the Roman system that the
barbarian tribes could readily assist with. Barbarian warriors consistently proved their martial
value in contests with Rome. Highly valued as recruits for Roman armies throughout the
duration of the Empire, they were employed at every level of Roman military service. We have
already seen that Valens reacted favorably to the initial request by the Goths seeking aid. Could
it then be argued that it was worth expanding Roman dominion into Germania to gain access to
increased levies? Why waste manpower, materials, and effort using force if you can gain soldiers
through negotiations? Conscription, especially in the later Empire, represented “literally a form
of taxation.” 64
This is an important aspect for understanding how a barbarian serving within the army
might see themselves. Would such a recruit be more likely to identify with other Germanic
peoples? Or would they identify themselves more with their Roman brothers in arms? Feucht
conducted an in-depth analysis on the similarities and differences in Roman funerary epitaphs
throughout the Empire. She specifies a number of similar aspects found in funerary inscriptions;
of note is the tribus, which she states is a “signal word for Roman citizenship.” 65
Feucht looked at seven major regions: Britannia, Germania, Gaul, Spain, Italy, Danube,
and Dalmatia. We see that in Germania, 66.7% (the largest percentage of all the regions) notated
their tribus on their funerary inscription, and in the Danube region 35.8% did so. In comparison,
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Britannia and Italy were around 27%, while in Gaul only 6.7% of the inscriptions included their
tribus. 66 This breakdown would indicate that in these regions it was either more common for the
soldiers to be Roman citizens, or, more likely, that they felt it was important to ensure their
Roman identity was known due to the intertwined nature of the province.
Besides military ties, the reliance on the Roman coinage system indicates another factor
that would imply the barbarians of Central Europe were far more invested in a Roman identity
than in that of a mythical Germanic nation. In the first century C.E., the barbarians across
Roman borders had no coinage or literacy, nor had they produced any substantial settlements. 67
By the fourth century, there had been a substantial influx of coinage, and the various tribes
across the Rhine and Danube had created semi-monetized communities. In a discussion on
Roman coinage in Northern Europe, Bursche says, “Coins, excepting perhaps glass beads, are
the most frequent category of Roman imports encountered in Barbaricum i.e. the territory north
of the Danube and east of the Rhine.” 68 He further states that Roman coinage existed in such
numbers in the region that it actually outnumbered medieval coinage.
Coins would have entered circulation in any number of ways, but the two most prominent
would be trade and lump sum payments to barbarian leaders by the empire. In the fourth century
(prior to the massive peace stipends of the fifth century) the majority of coinage would have
come into Barbaricum through trade. Commerce was of pressing importance to both sides of the
border. We have already seen that Valen’s crippling of the Goth’s trade was the reason for peace
in 369 C.E., not a decisive Roman victory. In discussing the campaigns of the Emperor Valens
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along the Danube in 367–369 C.E., Ammianus stated, “The interruption of trade had reduced the
barbarians to such want that they sent a number of delegations to beg for pardon and peace.” 69
While the need for trade was not as pressing for the Romans, it was a pressing concern placed on
their military leaders. Moisil points out that prior to 369 C.E., the Roman leader Themistios
complained that his military command revolved more around trade than military activity. 70
Other evidence for trade being the primary method of currency exchange in the fourth
century is the lack of gold coins, which were rare prior to the final decade of the fourth century.
Moisil says that large periods of the fourth century do not have a single example of gold
coinage. 71 The later increase is due to the control of the region by the Huns, and to the Roman
stipends paid to them and other hostile tribes. 72 Further evidence of the amount of trade with the
Empire lies in the various items found in graves around the fourth century. These include
Roman silverware, metalwork, and jewelry, 73 all of which would require Roman coins to
purchase.
The propagandistic nature of those coins is also an important aspect to the currency being
spread throughout barbarian lands. Not only where the barbarians adapting to the usage of coins,
but those coins would explain to them their place in the Roman world. The first example is the
“Barbarian/Hut” imagery. This coin has the inscription “FEL TEMP REPARATIO” or Felicium
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Temporum Reparatio (“The restoration of happy times”). 74 The imagery shows the Roman
soldier leading the small barbarian from his hut towards a better future. The Soldier is off to
future glories and takes the young barbarian with him to Romanize him. The small stature of the
barbarian implies both the taking of the youth, and the much larger and more powerful Roman
Empire in comparison to the barbarian tribe. 75
After Adrianople, we see far higher-value coins, the golden solidus, as the Roman
practice of bribery and payoffs being liberally used to avoid engaging in direct conflict.
Substantial sums were commonly paid to maintain peace, in response to various foreign threats.
A. D. Lee discusses payments in the fifth century C.E. to Alaric, Attila, and Theodoric, which
ranged from 1000 to 5000 lbs. of gold. 76 They were made to ensure security, and in hopes of not
having to gamble on warfare, which could cost far more (an exaggerated amount of seven
million solidi was given for an aborted effort to retake North Africa in 468 C.E., although it is
agreed that the losses were substantial). 77
This form of policy had the added benefit of restricting any effort to unite the various
peoples of the region against the Romans. The adage of divide and conquer is well represented
here, as the Romans maintained separate relations with varying tribes and chiefs, which they
used as political and economic leverage to keep communities separate. This strategy forced the
more ambitious members of the northern tribes to take note of their economic concerns before
attempting any form of unification.
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Conclusion

The cultural flexibility brought on by manpower exchange and trade is key to understanding the
frontier and border regions, as well as the adaptability of two peoples in constant interaction.
Halsall points out that there are virtually no instances of barbarian recruits betraying the Roman
army. 78 Those mentioned in sources are almost always due to the betrayers’ homes being
attacked. It is reasonable to expect a soldier of any time period to question attacking his own
family and neighbors. The fact that these soldiers, however, almost never balk at attacking other
Germanic tribes in the region would strongly indicate a lack of connectivity among the tribes and
strong incentives from the Romans to side with them on any given issue.
The various tribes of northern barbarians in Late Antiquity: Franks, Goths (Visigoths and
Ostrogoths), Vandals, Huns, Saxons, etc., all had their own chiefs, histories, and cultural
differences. The unifying factor between these tribes (possibly the only factor) was not their
Germanic bloodlines or shared history, but their interactions with the Roman Empire.

The

actions of Lupicinus provide a sterling example of the problems in imperial management during
the late Empire, including deviation from standard practice and exploitation of any given
situation for personal gain. This is the road to Adrianople. In the argument of decline or
transition, we again see elements of both. Clearly there was a decline of command and control
over the empire’s borders. The Gothic arrival on the Danube followed a decline of control in
Britannia, in North Africa, and on the eastern frontier. The mismanagement of the situation
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meant that the problems facing the Empire would soon be exponentially worse, and, for the first
time in Roman history, they would not be able to recover.
I believe it to be reasonably certain, however, that the road leading into and out of
Adrianople is a clear period of transition. The shift from a Roman world to a non-Roman one
began with the events in 376–378 C.E. Halsall says that he likes to imagine the Romans dealing
with the Goths from a position of strength. 79 In the coming decades, this approach would
become less and less the standard. The fifth century would be the final chapter of the Western
Empire’s story. And it began with Adrianople.
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CHAPTER 2- A DIET OF VICTORY: THE INABILITY TO RECOVER
FROM ADRIANOPLE

It is impossible to discuss nearly any subject on Rome without looking at the Roman military
system. This most Roman of institutions touches nearly every aspect of discovery or discourse
in the Roman world. Before returning to the narrative and the battle of Adrianople, this chapter
will look at the Roman army of Late Antiquity. One of the key reasons to include a discussion
on the military in this argument is the role it played in bringing various barbarian tribes into the
Roman fold. At first through auxiliaries, and followed by inclusion into the army as a whole, the
Roman military was the primary avenue for a barbarian to enter the Empire.
By the time the Roman Empire was reaching its twilight years, it had legions defending
borders from Britannia to Persia. The military made up the largest amount of imperial
expenditure, employing an estimated 600,000 men under arms. 80 The consistent need for
recruits was dealt with in many ways, but one of the most popular was to require allied or
conquered peoples to pay tribute with manpower.
As we have seen, the initial reasoning to allow the Goths under Fritigern to cross into
Roman lands was the potential for new recruits. This practice was common before and after
Adrianople. Perkins states that before any major campaign, the Roman army would swell with
barbarian recruits. 81 After the events of Adrianople, the practice of barbarian recruitment into
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the army not only continued, but greatly expanded. Barbarians often joined the army to fight
other barbarian tribes, and if a tribe was defeated its members would be recruited directly into
the victor’s force. For example, after defeating a Gothic army in 406 C.E., the Roman army
directly recruited many of the defeated Goths pushing them into military service. 82
Because Roman policy on barbarian recruitment continued after Adrianople, the
importance of the battle can be overstated. The battle, however, stands as a point of separation.
While on the surface, the policy of recruiting barbarians appears to be the same, there are some
key differences. In this chapter, we will begin by looking at the barbarians serving in the Roman
military and Rome’s various methods of recruitment. From there, the chapter will return to
Adrianople and discuss the aftermath as the new emperor Theodosius was appointed to end the
Gothic War. As Theodosius attempted to deal with the crisis, those key differences (and
weaknesses) in Roman policy will be explained.
With so many barbarians within its ranks, the Roman army represents the largest single
factor in the cultural blending that took place between Romans and the barbarians. A failure to
either integrate the various tribes into the Roman system fully or to defeat them on the
battlefield- created a crisis of legitimacy for Roman emperors. For centuries the strongest way to
secure an emperor’s position on the throne had been through conquest and victory. This “diet of
victory” 83 created an expectation for achievement, and when it did not come, a military and
political decline followed.
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The Roman Army of the Late Empire

The third century C.E. saw the Roman Empire face one crisis after another. To adapt to these
calamities, the Roman army went through a number of changes. By the fourth century C.E., it
was essentially divided into two distinctive parts, the comitatenses and the limitanei. Broadly,
the comitatenses was made up of the soldiers who accompanied the Emperor. They represented
the mobile field armies which fought the emperor’s wars. The limitanei, on the other hand, were
more localized troops. Somewhat similar to a national guard or militia, they were often made up
of troops from the surrounding regions. They were designed as a reactionary force, to hold the
line until the arrival of a larger and more capable imperial force.
This is not to imply the limitanei were incapable. Much ink has been spilled on the issue
of whether these forces were “second rate” troops, or if placing them in the cities made them less
effective. 84 The term comes from the soldiers on the limes, designating soldiers to “defend and
cultivate their lands.” 85 The local nature of the limitanei meant that peoples were policing their
neighbors, and both soldier and civilian comingled far more than the mobile field armies. It also
indicates that these soldiers were expected to cultivate the area, and be self-sufficient at least to
some level. 86
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The other evident difference in the late Roman military is the rising importance of
cavalry. The Romans had never been known as a cavalry power, relying historically on their
infantry. By the time of Adrianople, however, cavalry had become a larger and larger
component of the army. As early as the third century, the Romans began to expand their cavalry
arm, employing clibanarii, a form of lancer. 87 Their rising importance is also indicated by the
military posts created by the military reforms under Constantine.
After ridding himself of the Praetorian Guard, Constantine separated the army into two
pieces (distinct from the comitatenses and the limitanei mentioned above), dividing the cavalry
from the infantry. 88 He then created two new posts to lead the separate sections of the army: the
magister equitum (commander of the cavalry) and the magister peditum (commander of the
infantry). 89 Constantine likely intended these two officers to be of equal rank. 90 As the new
division was put into practice, however, it is telling that the magister equitum began to take
precedence over his infantry-leading counterpart. As Burns observed, “By the end of the century
the command of the Imperial cavalry was the highest honor in the Roman army.” 91
The increased importance of cavalry meant a more mobile field army, and a soldier who
was well trained and adapted to mounted combat. The cost and availability of horses, and the
time needed to train new mounted soldiers, meant considerable resources and time were required
to refit a depleted force. After Adrianople, Theodosius encountered just such an issue.
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Even when no major disaster had occurred, such a large network of both local and mobile
military forces meant that a constant stream of recruits and horses were needed. By the fourth
century, the Roman system regularly enlisted 30,000 men annually (a staggering number that it is
roughly equivalent to the annual recruiting goal of the United States Marine Corps). 92 The
peacetime army was typically able to meet their recruiting goals. In times of crisis, however,
that number could double. Horses were gathered through taxation in kind, stud farms, and direct
purchase by the imperial government. 93 With Roman military concerns representing the most
pressing need to an emperor, and an increasing disinterest in military service by the Roman
population, the emperors of Late Antiquity sought recruits wherever they could find them.
The late Roman army has been accused of “barbarization” for as long as histories have
been written on the subject. As noted previously, however, foreign soldiers in Roman military
service were certainly nothing new. In the surviving fragments of Rome’s first historian Quintis
Fabius Pictor (280-180 B.C.E) he describes a Gallic invasion (225 B.C.E) and the Roman
military response:
There are said to be eight hundred thousand armed men in the army of the two
consuls…. Of these, three hundred and forty-eight thousand two hundred were
foot soldiers of the Romans and Campanians, and twenty-six thousand six
hundred were cavalry; the rest of this large number was made up of allies. 94
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While the numbers quoted here are exaggerated, it is clear that at least as far back as the third
century B.C.E. when Romans began recording their history, the Roman army had incorporated
foreign soldiers. Often, as is the case in the example above, the army contained more “allies”
than Roman soldiers. For the soldiers themselves, the life was not easy, but there were
incentives for serving the Empire. Those attached to the Roman army could earn citizenship
when their service was completed. Figure 2 depicts a plaque granting citizenship to a soldier
who had reached his twenty-fifth year. Its level of detail indicates a systematic process. The
plaque would not be common, due to the requirement for the soldier to survive long enough to
earn it, but the process itself was not unusual.

Figure 2: 2nd Century Certificate Granting Citizenship to a Roman Soldier 95
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If anything, by Late Antiquity, that reliance on and need for non-Roman recruits had
increased. Around the period of Constantine, barbarians were no longer admitted to auxiliary
units only; they began to be recruited directly into Roman armies. 96 Looking back on the fourth
century Jordanes says, “It had long been a hard matter for the Roman army to fight any nations
whatsoever without them. This is evident from the way in which the Goths were so frequently
called upon.” 97 If we look at the Roman treatise of Vegetius (likely written during the reign of
Theodosius I, 378-395 C.E.), it appears that barbarians fit the mold of what was expected from a
soldier. According to Vegetius, “Peasants are the most fit to carry arms” and “smiths,
carpenters, butchers, and huntsman” make the best recruits. 98 He further stated that city dwellers
should only be used as a matter of necessity, and when that was the case they should be made to
endure harsh weather, hard work, and dull meals to quickly prepare them for the rigors of
warfare. 99
Taking Vegetius’s account as valid, the barbarians across the Rhine and Danube made far
better warriors than the local Romans, and many of them were prepared to join. In the fourth and
fifth centuries C.E., 75% of soldiers with a non-Roman name came from various Germanic
tribes. 100 The trade with Rome had caused the majority of the barbarians to live very close to the
border. Ammianus said that after Strasbourg the Romans entered “enemy country,” which was
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about “ten miles” past the river. 101 Burns agrees with his assessment, believing the majority of
the barbarian population to be close to the frontier border. 102 The barbarian chiefs were also
extremely willing to provide men for the Roman army. A large portion of their income revolved
around providing men for their Roman allies, in auxiliaries or as special units. It was integral to
a barbarian chief’s power to receive Roman gold, as these payments were divided among his
supporters, all of whom wanted their share. 103
Combined with the capability of the barbarian recruits for war, and the willingness of the
chief to provide men, was the fact that the individual barbarian recruit was often more interested
in joining the army than his Roman counterpart. By Late Antiquity, it was far more difficult to
convince the average Roman citizen of the merits in joining the military. As Adrian
Goldsworthy says, there was difficulty recruiting citizens into the army as early as “the first
century” C.E. 104
Life in the army was difficult, and the discipline was harsh. To be sure, there were
benefits to serving in the army such as enlistment bonuses and tax exemptions, but by the fourth
century C.E., the Roman citizenry appears to have felt that these rewards were not worth the
cost. Under Diocletian’s reforms, sons inherited their father’s profession, which included
military service. 105 Much of the reason Diocletian enacted that law was to ensure a consistent
flow of Roman recruits to the legions. Further evidence that indicates the difficulty in recruiting
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from the citizenry can be seen in the branding of recruits and the willingness for potential levies
to mutilate themselves to avoid service, while the majority of barbarian recruits were
volunteers. 106
Requiring sons to join the army was one way to prevent shortfalls in recruitment efforts.
Another was taxing large landowners by forcing them to supply recruits based on the size of their
estate. By the time of Adrianople, one could avoid military service by paying a tax to the empire
directly, the adaeratio. Because of the vast number of willing barbarian men prepared to serve
in the army, this became the preferred way of finding new recruits. Citizens and landowners
paid a direct tax to avoid either military service or sending the men who worked the fields (and
not the best men) into the army. The income then funded the army, with several barbarian tribes
providing the actual bodies that to the ranks. 107
The professionalization of the Roman army also meant that its strength relied on the
strength of the treasury. It required vast amounts of food, forage, pack animals, armor, and pay.
Therefore, it relied on gold. 108 And these were just the typical expenditures; bonuses, payouts,
bribes, and donatives were extra. For the year 400 C.E., for example, it is estimated the army
represented half of the imperial budget. 109 Perhaps this is another reason for the desire to enlist
barbarians. For these recruits, war was a just and normal way of life, a manly pursuit. 110
imperial politics were perhaps less important to these men (at least until later on in the century).
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We have already seen that the Gothic forces that crossed the Danube in 376 C.E. were
allowed to do so because Valens saw them as potential soldiers for his upcoming war in the East.
The fourth century saw a steady rise in numbers and influence of barbarians in the Roman army.
By the latter half of the fourth century, barbarians made up a substantial percentage of recruits
and were well represented in the officer corps, and by the turn of the century barbarians were
present in all levels of command. 111 Whittaker mentions that ultimately it was unclear who were
barbarians and who were Romans. 112 To the Roman public of the fourth century, the words
“barbarian” and “soldier” were becoming interchangeable. 113
The largest distinction that can be made before and after Adrianople is how barbarians
were placed in the military, and under what officers these soldiers would serve. 114 The common
practice of barbarian incorporation, whether in the army or just as settlers in Roman lands, had
always been to break up the groups and scatter them. By separating recruits from their various
tribal origins, they would be unable to confer within the ranks, thus ensuring a healthy dose of
Romanization in military service. Furthermore, they would not serve under barbarian officers, in
an attempt to maintain the same forms of division.
In the late Roman army, however, the opposite began to occur. Instead of being a vehicle
for Romanization, the Roman army began to adopt barbarian ways. Considering the length of
service of a Roman soldier and the fact that the majority of the men remained on the frontiers for
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most of this time, it is hard to fathom that such an influence would not take place. 115 While this
transformation appears to have no impact on the martial effectiveness of the army, as this
separation from traditional Roman ways occurred, conservative Roman citizens began to notice.
Halsall says this shift was likely caused by the separation of civic and military duties under the
reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. 116 It can then be surmised that the Roman Empire,
already facing recruitment difficulties among citizens, would have driven potential Roman
recruits away with the increasing separation of civic and military goals.
Adrianople, 378 C.E.

In the first chapter, an extensive discussion on the road to Adrianople was examined. The
Roman General Lupicinus had treated the Goths crossing into the empire harshly, forcing those
entering to sell themselves and/or their families into slavery just to eat. As a result of the rising
tension, Lupicinus made a botched attempt to assassinate the Gothic leaders. To quiet the
situation, he released Fritigern, who then took command of the soldiers at his disposal and
defeated Lupicinus. The Goths then took to the countryside, operating largely unchecked for the
next two years.
Finally, in August of 378 C.E., Valens arrived with an Imperial army to handle the
situation. He faced a substantial public relations problem during this period, as he had allowed
the Goths to cross the border in the first place. His generals had botched the situation, and now it
had taken him an inexplicably long time to respond. To make matters worse, Valens was being
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embarrassed by his nephew Gratian, who was winning victories against the Alamanni on the
Rhine frontier.
To be sure, Valens did not just sit in the East while the Goths raided the countryside.
Ammianus stated that Valens immediately sent his master of cavalry to Persia to arrange a
settlement on the Armenian question. Simultaneously, he headed to Constantinople while
dispatching two of his generals, Profuturus and Trajan, to stem the Gothic flood. 117 But
Ammianus acknowledged that the generals were of poor quality. Although the best course of
action would have been to wear down the enemy, they decided to attack the Goths directly (a far
more Roman approach), resulting in a number of inconclusive battles resulted. 118
Meanwhile, Gratian was unable to assist in the East. The Lentienses, a sub-tribe of the
Alamanni, recognized that the Romans were preoccupied with dealing with the Gothic crisis.
They decided to take advantage of the situation and attack in the west across the Rhine. 119 The
situation was spiraling out of control. Preoccupied with the Lentienses, Gratian was unable to
move east; the generals Valens had appointed were seemingly making the situation worse, and
the Roman people were beginning to question why the Emperor was failing to deal with the
barbarians. With the Persian frontier safe for the moment, Valens decided to proceed to Thrace
and deal with the Fritigern and the Goths himself.
As he arrived, however, he was greeted with the news that Gratian had defeated the
Lentienses, pushing them back across the Rhine. Gratian wrote that he was headed to meet with
his uncle and unite their armies, and he urged Valens to await his arrival. At the city of
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Hadrianopolis, the name that would be given to the battle, Valens asked his advisors about the
best move to make. The large majority of the war council pushed for Valens to attack the Gothic
force immediately. Remembering the unhappy mob at Constantinople, combined with the
embarrassment of Gratian’s recent victories and a council that believed the battle would be easily
won even without Gratian’s forces, Valens decided on battle. 120
Valens was cautioned by his master of cavalry, Victor, to await Gratian. Ammianus said,
however, that the emperor’s “fatal obstinacy” made him decided on battle. 121 To be fair to
Valens, the council was operating on bad intelligence. Their information placed the size of the
Gothic army at around 10,000 men, far less than the emperor expected. 122 To further Valens’
perception that he was holding the superior force, a Christian priest was sent by Fritigern to
discuss peace. The emissary requested an end to hostilities and permission for the Goths to settle
in Thrace. 123 So a combination of pride, faulty intelligence, and misreading of the reasons for a
peace proposal led Valens to decide on a confrontation.
On the morning of August 9, the Romans set out to meet their foe, marching until about
two in the afternoon. As Zosimus wrote, “(As ill fortune would have it) the Emperor drew forth
his whole army without any order at all.” 124 Parched from the summer heat and exhausted, the
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Romans got into formation slowly, 125 while the Goths stalled for time. 126 Fritigern decided to
send two more peace envoys to suggest a hostage swap. While the two sides were negotiating
the exchange, the battle suddenly began. Before the Roman lines were fully drawn up, the
commanders Cassio and Bacurius started the attack. They began by firing arrows at the enemy,
rashly engaging them, and they were quickly pushed back. 127
The unexpected start to the battle forced the unformed wings into action [Figure 3].
These were a mixture of cavalry and infantry, with the heavy infantry forming the center.
Placing their baggage and families in the circle, the Goths had formed a defensive position by
circling the wagons, trying to hold off the Roman onslaught long enough for reinforcements to
arrive. As the left wing of the Roman force neared a breakthrough, the Gothic cavalry and a
supporting party of Alans suddenly appeared. 128
The unexpected arrival of the superior Gothic cavalry created a panic on the Roman left
wing. The Roman cavalry broke, abandoning the accompanying infantry. The Goths then
pressed the heavy infantry in the middle on both sides. The core of the Roman army was now
surrounded and forced so tightly together that they could barely move, let alone fight. 129
Exhausted, hungry, surrounded, and outnumbered, it was completely destroyed, with somewhere
between 10,000 and 20,000 men being killed. 130 Emperor Valens likely fell on the field,
possibly by an arrow wound. In the account of Zosimus, Valens retreated from the field with
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the few survivors from his army and took refuge in an unwalled village (no name given), which
the Goths surrounded and torched. 131
Regardless of how Valens met his end, he and the majority of this army died at
Adrianople. The battle is a primary example of Murphy’s Law. Everything that could have gone
wrong did. If Valens had known the full size of the Gothic army, had not rushed his men into
combat, and had allowed the men to rest and to form up properly, the battle would still have been
difficult and favored the Goths. When none of these things happened, and a surprise force of
superior Gothic cavalry hit the exposed flank of the Roman wing, they had little chance of
victory.
Valens’ defeat placed him on the short list of emperors who died in battle. Adrianople
joined the list of great Roman military disasters, and it was arguably the worst. Whatever the
actual number of Roman casualties, no substantial force existed in the Eastern Empire
immediately afterwards. Not only were the Goths able to move east completely unchecked, but
if any of the Empire’s eastern enemies decided to attack, nothing could stop them. Knowing full
well that this was the case, Fritigern headed east towards Constantinople.
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Figure 3: Battle map of Adrianople 132

Immediate Aftermath

In the midst of the discussion of this overwhelming defeat, it should be stated again that
Adrianople was not the cause of Rome’s fall. Had not Rome, in the days of the Republic,
survived not one, but three such defeats, by Hannibal at Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae?
Was there not still a Roman emperor in charge of an Imperial army in the West, with a string of
recent victories? Were not the Roman walls still too formidable for the Gothic army to
overcome? The Romans had survived and dealt with defeats such as these many times, but the
battle of Adrianople stands as a watershed for Ancient Rome. Yet, if we look at the results of the
battle, it becomes clear that this defeat cannot shoulder the blame for Rome’s end.
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The immediate aftermath of Adrianople was anticlimactic. Fritigern and the Goths had
just destroyed an imperial army, killed the Eastern (and senior) Roman emperor, and were free to
operate unmolested in the East. The forces under Gratian knew that the Goths greatly
outnumbered them, and with the momentum going against the Romans they were unlikely to
commit to a battle. Despite this, the Goths were unable to capitalize on their victory.
Arriving at the city of Adrianople, the Goths were unable to take it. Valens had left
enough of a defense force there that the Goths could not overcome it. Moving east after their
victory, they came upon Constantinople. It goes without saying that if the Goths could not
overcome the walls and defenses of Adrianople, they had no hope of taking Constantinople.
Ammianus comments that the Gothic spirit was dampened when they contemplated the long
circuit of walls that made up the city. 133
The two sides settled into a stalemate, with the Goths unable to capitalize on their victory
and the Romans unable to counter it. Halsall states that Ammianus relates Adrianople to Cannae
because, as in the third century B.C.E., Rome was able to recover once again. 134 I disagree with
Halsall on this point. It is in the next decade that the blueprint for the military and political fall
of Rome was created. The Roman response to the Gothic crisis, in the fancifully named Gothic
War, would be what doomed the Empire. As Jordanes says, “From this time the Visigoths, in
consequence of their glorious victory, possessed Thrace and Dacia as if it were their native
land.” 135 This doom did not occur immediately, but the Roman West certainly never recovered
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in the way Halsall alludes to. 136 That responsibility lies at the feet of Gratian and the man he
appointed to handle the problem, Theodosius I.
We have discussed the role that Theodosius the Elder played in the road to Adrianople.
Despite the execution of his father, Theodosius answered Gratian’s call for assistance in this time
of crisis. Gratian, however, did not allow Theodosius to take the purple immediately. He was
initially made magister equitum, in what appears to be a test run of his capabilities. Feeling out
the general and his loyalties (to see if he harbored any lasting resentment) was a wise move by
Gratian. After this short trial run, Theodosius was appointed Augustus on January 19, 379
C.E. 137 His primary charge as emperor was to handle the Gothic crisis.
Jordanes praises Theodosius as a leader, recognizing him for his “acuteness and
discretion,” and that through “stern commands,” “generosity,” and “kindness” he was able to
push a demoralized army into action. 138 Ammianus relates Adrianople to Cannae, and discusses
the temporary setback to the Romans. 139 Halsall believes that this comparison to Cannae creates
an indirect comparison of Theodosius to Scipio Africanus, 140 although a more apt one would
have been to the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Cuncator, the delayer.
Theodosius was responsible for rebuilding a defeated and demoralized army. The task of
rebuilding the army would have meant acquiring new recruits, without the reliability of the
typical barbarian (at least Gothic) men to fill the ranks, and once these men were recruited they
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would have been raw and green. They were certainly not soldiers one would want to send into
battle against a hardened and victorious opponent. The likely course of action, as opposed to
Halsall’s “three years of hard campaigning,” would have been the delaying tactics used by
Fabius. 141 Like Fabius, Theodosius knew he could not risk another defeat. He moved,
countered, and checked the Goths as he could, but he would have attempted to avoid direct
action with his untested army. Theodosius’s leadership style seems to be represented by levelheaded thinking, in contrast to the rash actions of Africanus.
Little is known about the period between the ascension of Theodosius and the end of the
Gothic War. What we do know is that for the majority of the period there were few battles. No
clear victor emerged by the time a peace settlement was reached. In 382 C.E., the two sides
came to an agreement. The negotiations took place from a position of “compromised
strength.” 142 The Goths would be allowed to settle in Roman lands in exchange for military
service. The land grant was a necessity to strengthen the depleted strength of the Roman army.
As Jordanes recounts about the Goths in service to the Emperor Theodosius, “Now when
Athanaric was dead, his whole army continued in the service of the Emperor Theodosius and
submitted to Roman rule, forming as it were one body with the Imperial soldiery.” 143
The difference from past practices, however, was that the Goths would now be settled in
the Empire in unbroken groups. The new soldiers would serve with their native brothers, and
they would be led by native commanders. The policy of divide and dilute was put aside for an
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expedited peace agreement. As Harper says, “For half a millennium, the Roman army had been
one of the most effective means of assimilating foreigners into the Empire. Now, the
barbarization of the army would begin in earnest.” 144
From a military standpoint, the soldiers responsible for the death of an emperor, the
defeat of an imperial army, and the sheer panic of the last six years were now brothers in arms.
This new army was designed to protect the Roman citizenry they had just spent the better part of
a decade attacking. We have discussed at length that barbarian recruits were nothing new or
extraordinary. Now, however, they were operating under their own officers and in a force made
up of their kin. They were essentially a force within a force, which may or may not be depended
on in times of crisis.
Finally, the social and cultural aspect must be addressed. Roman emperors raised the
Roman population on what Peter Heather and John Mathews called “a diet of victory.” 145 The
people were told how superior their army was, how superior their emperors were, and how
superior they themselves were. How many Roman generals and emperors had taken the title
“Germanicus?” They were told incessantly how much better they were than their barbarian
counterparts. One of the most commonly circulated coins in the fourth century was that of the
barbarian at the end of a Roman spear. 146
This attitude created a problem of legitimacy. The so called “barracks emperors” of the
third century had made their names with the army and victory. 147 The army under Theodosius in
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the late fourth century was weak, and he achieved neither victory nor vengeance for Valens. Not
that Theodosius should shoulder all the responsibility. He inherited an impossible situation. It
was not even Theodosius who made the first peace: Gratian was the first to do so, with the
Goths, in 380 C.E. 148 Theodosius had taken ill, and Gratian was unsure if he would survive (not
that Theodosius would fail to approve; quite the contrary — according to Jordanes, Theodosius
wanted the same thing).
When the Emperor Theodosius afterwards recovered and learned that the Emperor
Gratian had made a compact between the Goths and the Romans, as he had himself desired, he
took it very graciously and gave his assent. He gave gifts to King Athanaric, who had succeeded
Fritigern, made an alliance with him and in the most gracious manner invited him to visit him at
Constantinople. 149
The remaining years of the Gothic War, and its eventual conclusion, are difficult to
decipher clearly. An agreement seems to have been made that the Goths would be brought into
the Roman fold in 381 C.E., when Athanaric died (as mentioned by Jordanes). The following
year, however, the Goths appear to have elected Alaric as their new king and rejected the recent
treaty of inclusion. 150 In 382 C.E., another agreement was reached, and the traditional view is
the Gothic settlement mentioned above.
Too further muddy the waters, however, there is little evidence of what that treaty
entailed. As Halsall points out, “Unfortunately, as even those who argue for the dramatic
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significance of the ‘foedus of 382’ admit, we know nothing about this ‘treaty.’” 151 What
historians have pieced together is largely a reflection of the character of Gothic interactions
following 382 C.E. This supposition seems reasonable, but the precise nature of the Gothic
relationship to Rome after the war is not clear.
What is clear is that Adrianople changed the game, and that Theodosius embraced the
new relationship (in whatever form it took), either from natural desire or from necessity. As
Heather says, “Hadrianople stands as a uniquely decisive military confrontation in the history of
Gotho-Roman relations after 376. On no other occasion did one side destroy the other so
thoroughly.” 152 Being unable to produce military strength, Theodosius instead made himself a
friend and ally of the Goths. Even Halsall acknowledges the unusual elements to the new
relationship with the Goths: “Rather than being sold off into slavery, or made tenants, they
appear to have been granted land, probably in deserted areas, and to have paid taxes.” 153
Jordanes recounts that Theodosius “took from their number more than twenty thousand warriors
to serve against the tyrant Eugenius, who had slain Gratian and seized Gaul.” 154 Thousands of
Goths would die defending Theodosius. 155
We also know that Theodosius was not afraid to bring barbarians into the highest ranks of
the Empire. He married his favorite niece, Serena, to Stilicho, the son of a Vandal officer. 156
Stilicho, went on to be the supreme general of Honorius after the death of Theodosius, and was
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essentially the de facto emperor for a time. 157 It has been pointed out many times that barbarians
serving in the military was nothing new. The character of involvement, however, clearly
changed after the peace of 382 C.E.
Decline?

The issue becomes whether this any real evidence of a decline. If so, can the responsibility be
placed on the barbarians? From the appearance of things, Rome remained strong through the end
of the fourth century. Theodosius ruled over a larger Empire than Augustus. 158 Even if the
relationship had shifted (dramatically or not) between the Romans and the barbarians (at this
point, specifically the Goths), was it enough to alter the empire? The Western Empire would
continue on into the Fifth Century. Under Stilicho, victories against the Goths were achieved.
Even after Stilicho’s removal and the sack of Rome in 410 C.E., the West did not fall.
I again conclude that it was imperial mismanagement that eventually caused the end of
the Empire in the West. The political ambitions of Roman leaders did not abate because of the
Gothic crisis. In 383 C.E., Magnus Maximus usurped the purple in Britain, and after crossing
into Gaul, he had Gratian assassinated. 159 He then pushed into Italy and ousted Valentinian II
from his seat, before Theodosius finally brought him to heel. Defeating Maximus at Aquieleia,
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Theodosius reinstated Valentinian II as the Western Emperor, under the tutelage of the Frankish
General Arbogast. 160
This new relationship did not last long. Valentinian II died in 392 C.E., with Arbogast
claiming to have killed him and appointing Eugenius to replace him. 161 Theodosius then rode
West to defeat the forces of Eugenius and Arbogast in battle in 394 C.E. (with a large contingent
of Gothic troops, as we have seen from Jordanes’ account 162). After putting down two civil wars
and becoming the last emperor to rule over a combined empire, Theodosius died four months
later, leaving the empire split between his two sons, Honorius in the West and Arcadius in the
East. Neither was of age (they were ten and seventeen, respectively). 163
Before Theodosius had time to consolidate control, the empire was again thrown into
chaos due to new leadership. Likely even more destructive was the lack of time the emperor had
to cultivate a new and evolving relationship with the various barbarians in his service. Jordanes
states that when he died he was remembered as “the lover of peace and of the Gothic race,” 164
but it appears that the only relationship Theodosius and the Goths had was that of war (rather
fighting each other or on the same side). Alaric soon capitalized on the imperial instability and
revolted. 165 Jordanes appears to be critical of both the Roman and Gothic sides as we move into
the fifth century. On the sons of Theodosius, he says that they “began to ruin both Empires by
their luxurious living and to deprive their allies.” Of the Goths he declared, “The contempt of the
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Goths for the Romans soon increased, and for fear their valor would be destroyed by long peace,
they appointed Alaric king over them.” 166
The more problematic aspect of imperial mismanagement was that the Roman people,
especially the conservative element, did not want the barbarians to be so involved in empire or
represent their interests. For the conservative Roman, the best barbarian was a dead one. 167
Whittaker says that despite an increased level of assimilation, frontier ideology “became more
extreme in its praise of traditional Roman values and superiority.” 168 Yet by the fifth century,
the majority of Limitanei were of recent barbarian ancestry, and in some areas an entire portion
of the frontier was under barbarian control. 169 Instead of embracing this new relationship, the
average Roman despised it.
A further problem in deciphering the Roman/barbarian relationship in the final century of
the Western Empire is that all of the sources are Roman and are extremely hostile towards the
barbarians. As Whittaker says, “Treachery of the barbarian who served in the army is taken for
granted by almost every contemporary source.” 170 The accounts that became available in the
sixth century can be unreliable. Halsall says of Jordanes, “Jordanes’ whole work is aimed at
portraying the Goths as a unified people.” 171
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We know as the emperors transitioned from the Principate to the Dominant they
separated themselves more and more from the public eye. When Eusebius describes
Constantine, he is hailed as being nearly divine and is judged to be superior to both Cyrus and
Alexander. 172 While there is no question of the religious bias within Eusebius’s writing, it is still
a far cry from the description of earlier emperors. Tacitus writes the following of Augustus:
But when old age incapacitated him, his approaching end brought hopes of
change. A few people started idly talking of the blessings of freedom. Some,
more numerous, feared civil war; others wanted it. The great majority, however,
exchanged critical gossip about candidates for succession. 173

It is plain to see the difference in relationship the emperors had to their subjects by Late
Antiquity. The Principate model by this time was long gone. As a near divine character, the
emperor of Late Antiquity had more in common with the ancient Persian model of kingship.
Yet, when this godlike leader was unable to defeat barbarian rabble, how were the Romans
expected to respond?
While the difference in ruling style from early to late Empire is of no surprise to any
scholar, the point is in the separation between the emperor and Roman society. The people of
Rome did not keep up with the many changes made in the empire. According to Harper, “There
was more structural change in the administration of the Empire in the hundred years between
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Diocletian (r. AD 284-305) and Theodosius (r.379-395) than there had been in the first three
centuries of Empire, combined.” 174
Rome revolved around the emperor, and in the fourth century, those emperors were not
up to the task at hand. Diocletian, Constantine, Julian, Theodosius; these emperors of the third
and fourth century provided strong leadership and made changes within the empire to secure
Rome’s future. The emperors of the fifth century, however, were not up to the monumental task
they faced. The inept Honorius allowed Stilicho, his greatest general, to be killed in 408 C.E.,
while a seven-year-old Theodosius II was ascending to the Eastern Imperial seat. 175 Two years
later, Alaric, the enemy Stilicho had spent much of his time countering, sacked Rome.
Honorius’ successor in the west, Valentinian III also ascended to the purple as a child
ruler in 425 C.E. Between Honorius and Valentinian III, Spain, Gaul, and North Africa were lost
to the Roman west. Valentinian’s murder would be arranged by his successor Petronius Maximus
in 455 C.E., Petronius rule would last less than three months. 176 Petronius’ death occurred while
fleeing Rome in the face of another invading army. The Vandals under Geiseric were allowed
into the eternal city without any resistance, and they systematically looted the city. 177 Between
the assassination of Valentinian III and the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 C.E, nine
different emperors ruled the Western Roman Empire. Most never reached a second year in the
purple.
Before Adrianople, Rome was the clear power in the region. It dominated the ancient
world from Britannia to the border with Persia. After Adrianople, Rome maintained its position
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as the largest power, but was clearly weaker and now faced increased levels of competition. By
the dawning of the fifth century, Rome in the West was just one power competing with various
others. By the end of the century, it was gone. The inept Roman emperors of the fifth century
proved unable to contend with the numerous problems facing Rome, and were far more
interested in maneuvering for their year in the purple than finding solutions to Rome’s increasing
troubles.
Culturally, Rome lived on in the West, even as it transitioned from Roman Emperors to
Barbarian Kings. In his campaign against Rome, Alaric seemed more Roman in his actions than
Gothic. These new barbarian kings inherited the Roman way of doing business (of course, as
defined in their own manner). They were not unlike Charlemagne, who painted himself in the
brush of Rome three centuries later, styling himself the Roman Emperor. Medieval kings,
counts, and commanders were even known to carry a copy of Vegetius with them on
campaign. 178
I have tried to show the barbarians as individuals who were more or less forced into
conflict with Rome. Before the battle, barbarians again attempted peace negotiations to settle in
Roman land. 179 Once the war ended and the barbarians were settled, the Roman people pushed
back against these new settlers incessantly. Whatever fall or transition took place should not be
placed on the shoulders of the barbarians. As quoted above, Heather points out that the key
military event between the Goths and the Romans was at Adrianople, nearly a century before the
Western Empire had truly collapsed.

Vegetius, Introduction. 7.
While these are traditionally painted as stalling tactics, that description is given to them by hostile Roman
authors. That is not to say they were not stalling, it is just to say that there is every potential that the peace talks
were legitimate.
178
179

58

Yet, with the many volumes of scholarly research on the subject, why is the popular
image of the dramatic barbarian invasion that led to Rome’s collapse still alive and well? In the
following chapter we will discuss social and historical memory, and examine why this false
image remains.
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CHAPTER 3- CEMENTING A FALSE IDENTITY

The discussion so far has revolved around the events of the late fourth century, the Goth’s
crossing of the Danube, the Battle of Adrianople, and the aftermath of the military disaster. We
have seen that the Goths were responding to a crisis created by Roman ineptness and disregard.
The conclusion to the Gothic War signified a changing of the guard. The Gothic tribes, however,
represent only a portion of the problem faced by the waning Roman Empire. As the calendar
moves to a new century, the Franks, Saxons, Vandals, and Huns provided ample problems for
the empire.
While it is true that each of these groups took a nibble from the Romans, it must also be
remembered that the future had yet to be written. The Goths who had fought the Romans during
the Gothic War (376-382 C.E.) settled in Roman lands after making peace with Theodosius. The
peace was short lived. In 410 C.E., following renewed hostilities, Alaric led an army into Rome
and sacked the city for the first time in nearly 800 years. Yet in 451 C.E., only 41 years later, the
Goths were working alongside the Romans against the Huns (not to mention the various other
tribes, with their own complicated and shifting alliances with or against Rome) at the Battle of
the Catalaunian Plains (451 C.E.). 180 Franks, Visigoths, Burgundians, and others fought with the
Roman General Flavius Aetius against Attila and his Huns. On the other side of the field, the
ranks of Attila’s army also incorporated the Franks, Goths, and Burgundians. 181 This complex
relationship has failed to be remembered in popular discourse.
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The focus of this final chapter will be of collective and popular memory. Popular
memory is defined as including all the ways in which a sense of the past is constructed, not just
literary scholarship. 182 In this “social production” of memory, everyone participates. 183
Everyone is a historian if not a scholar, because as Cubitt says, “the sense of the past, and the
complex processes of memory that sustain and develop it, make a contribution to the historical
process that is not peripheral, but integral and often crucial.” 184 Memory, however, is only half
of the equation. When investigating what is remembered, the scholar must also ask what is being
forgotten? Often the collective and social memory do not tell the full story. As Reiff says,
“collective historical memory is no respecter of the past.” 185
The question this final chapter addresses, and the point of this thesis as a whole, is to ask
why, with all the rich scholarly work done on this period, does the popular memory of these
tribes continue to identify them as the Germans who caused the Fall of Rome? The barbarian’s
role in Rome’s fall has been remembered, but their supportive role within the empire has been
largely forgotten. By looking at popular imagery, monuments, art, literature, and language I
argue that the barbarian image has been largely fabricated, and that inaccurate representation
continues to the present day, clouding their historical memory and true past. The largest problem
is that there is little popular disagreement on the false presentation of the barbarians, and even
the Germans themselves have come to embrace it.
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Imagine if the “Lost Cause” myth of the Southern States in the American Civil War had
never been countered. This war ended only 154 years ago. While racial struggles no doubt
continue in the United States, “Separate but Equal” was both established and abolished in that
period of time. African Americans have been able to rise through adversity to establish
themselves in all realms of society, and they even reached the Presidency for the first time under
Barack Obama. Confederate monuments are being torn down, and the “Lost Cause” story has
lost the majority of its followers. There is no doubt that more needs to be done, but the winds of
change are in motion.
Compare that timetable to the popular myth of German invaders destroying the Roman
Empire. In 1937, the National Socialist Party held a parade to commemorate the “Two
Thousand Years of German Culture,” and had numerous floats dedicated to the “Germanic
Age.” 186 The Germanic barbarians are thus represented as the precursors to the German state
and are praised for their actions, 1,461 years after the fall of the Western Empire. Not only is it
telling that the Nazi movement was trying to tie itself to the Germanic barbarians of the past, but
of the seven sections of the parade, the “Germanic Age” represented the second largest, with 480
participants. 187
The Nazi party was of course trying to recreate their history, propagating a German
national identity that first found footing in the nineteenth century. Yet, they are not the only
ones responsible of using the Germanic tribes in their propaganda. While Adolf Hitler was
trying to make a name for himself in the trenches of France, the allies were painting the German
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Army as an invading group of Huns [Figure 4]. This is the crux of the problem. Very little
dissent to the portrayal of the barbarian have existed, and therefore the historian faces the
challenge of convincing the public that this multi-millennium notion is incorrect.

Figure 4: World War I propaganda poster relating the German Army to the Huns. 188

It should be noted that this is not an argument or discussion on the creation of German
national identity. As the argument moves closer to modernity, however, it will no doubt have to
be addressed. A full explanation of German identity is beyond the scope of this work, but it is
important in the discussion on why the “Germanic” nature of the barbarians remains a powerful
social idea. This chapter aims to investigate ancient, early modern, and modern sources to trace
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the continuation and propagation of the myth of Germans destroying Rome. By considering the
most popular sample of “Germanic invaders,” the Goths of the late fourth century, the first two
chapters have shown that there was no united German front attacking the Roman boundaries.
This was a loosely united tribal society that was pushed into combat by Roman cruelty,
disregard, and mismanagement. As the ripples of time grew larger, however, and the historian
sought answers to explain the destruction of the Rome, the barbarian invasion provided an easy
explanation.
This chapter is by no means a comprehensive list of the variety of ways the myth has
been proliferated. Examples of sources range from Caesar’s first explanation of the people
across from the Rhine to modern aggrandizement of barbarian leaders. In this way, the argument
can be made while fitting within the scope of this thesis.
Ancient Period

The beginning of the problem starts long before the Goths crossed the Danube in 376 C.E. The
Romans had a deeply rooted fear of barbarian invasions. After the sack of Rome by the Gauls in
390 B.C.E., the famous words recorded by Livy provide a summation of Roman feelings: “Woe
to the Vanquished.” 189 The sack of Rome became ingrained in the Roman memory, even if the
event itself was largely exaggerated and expanded upon by Livy and the other Roman historians
when retelling it.
While the Gauls have their own history, the Roman fear of barbarian invasion can
certainly be traced to them. They also are the subject of Caesar’s commentaries, in which the
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“Germans” were first described. Marius had fought the Cimbri and the Teutones long before
Caesar was campaigning in Gaul, yet it was Caesar’s up-close experience and decision to discuss
their ethnography that stands as the genesis for the Roman view of the various Germanic tribes.
In the first book of Caesar’s commentaries, he states, “He could also see that it posed a
danger to the Roman people that the Germans were gradually becoming accustomed to crossing
the Rhine River,” and he continues by calling the Germans “a wild and barbarous people.” 190
Caesar’s book six goes into a digression on his perception of the ethnography of the Gauls,
which he contrasts with that of the Germans. He states, “The German way of life is very
different…Their whole life is spent on hunting and military pursuits.” 191
The importance of Caesar’s description should not be understated. While he speaks
largely in generalities (he even says as much), the popularity of his works in Rome was
substantial. 192 Caesar’s intention in writing his commentaries was to maintain his prominence in
the public’s mind while being out on campaign. Remember that Caesar was a politician, and the
quote above from Book One was used in his argument for why the Gallic Wars were necessary
in the first place. By the end of the wars, Caesar “was wealthier, had a more extensive network
of friends and clients, and could boast of greater and more glorious achievements than any other
senator except for Pompey.” 193
As his popularity grew, so would the number of readers who kept up with his campaign.
Soon Caesar could state that the dreaded Gauls had “gradually become accustomed to losing in
war and, having been beaten in many battles, no longer even compare their own courage with
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that of the Germans.” 194 When one of Rome’s most monumental figures told his readers that the
Germans were even more ferocious than their ancient Gallic enemy, they would doubtless give
such statements considerable notice.
If the Gauls represented the boogeyman of the Republic, the Germans would come to
represent the same for the Empire. Seventeen different emperors took upon themselves one of
the various honorifics that indicate a victory over the Germans. At the time of the next ancient
writer, Cornelius Tacitus in the first century C.E., this transition was well under way.
Caesar may have introduced the Roman world to the threat of the Germans, but Tacitus
dedicated a book (even if small) to their existence. On the Origin and Location of the Germani,
or simply Germania, was lost until the Early Modern Period, but in the ancient world it would
certainly have garnered a large readership. Possibly written as a companion piece to the
Agricola at the end of the first century C.E., Germania continued many of the themes seen in
Caesar’s description of the Germanic tribes. 195 Seemingly, its primary point was to remind the
Romans that Germania remained unconquered, and that they were a group not to be taken
lightly. As Tacitus wrote, “The Germani have no taste for peace; renown is more easily won
among perils, and you cannot maintain a large body of companions except by violence and
war.” 196 He continues, “They think it is spiritless and slack to gain by sweat what they can buy
with blood.” 197
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Unlike the Agricola or Tacitus’s later works, there is little structure or attention to detail.
Some believe Tacitus was trying to entice the new emperor, Trajan, to finish the work of
Augustus and to finally conquer the stubborn tribes across the Rhine and Danube. 198 The
disaster in the Teutoburg Forest (9 C.E.), the worst Roman military defeat since Cannae, would
have been fresh in his mind. Despite its being nearly a century prior, the legions had not
avenged themselves for this disaster. After Cannae, the Romans continued to fight, and Scipio
defeated Hannibal. Germania, however, remained unconquered after its decisive victory over the
Romans. As Tacitus says, “Neither the Samnites nor the Carthaginians, neither Hispania nor
Gaul, not even the Parthians have taught us more painful lessons.” 199
Whatever Tacitus’s goal for the work may have been, Germania’s survival would
establish it as a mythical explanation of who the ancient Germans were. After its rediscovery, it
would become a textbook for an ideological version of Germanness, from the Renaissance to the
Third Reich. The irony, of course, is that Tacitus never set foot in the lands across the Rhine.
He was working largely from existing descriptions, some of which were dated and did not
properly describe the current tribal makeup in the region. The account is short and generalized.
It is almost a tragedy that the work survived, while so many others did not.
Arnoldo Momigliano stated that Germania was one of the most dangerous books ever
written. 200 Christopher Krebs, in his book titled after Momigliano’s statement, observes, “In the
formation of the core concepts of the National Socialist ideology—racism, the ideology of the
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Volk and its spirit, and the self-same Germanic myth—Tacitus’s Germania played a major
role.” 201
Tacitus’s later Histories and his Annals would become key manuscripts in our
understanding of the first century of the Empire. For his contemporary audience, he no doubt
reinforced the existing stereotypes of the Germanic tribes. Caesar had warned the Romans about
the Germans. Varus and his legions had been destroyed by the Germans. Despite the successes
of Tiberius, he had failed to bring the Germans to heel. Now yet another description of these
people as a threat to Rome appeared to reinforce the concept of a northern barbaric tribe to be
feared.
The breadth of Tacitus’s contemporary readership cannot be known. Germania is more
important to study for the fictitious concept of the ancient Germans that nationalistic thinkers
latched on to, as part of the drive to dissect or reconstruct German identity. Despite this
unknown factor, the book reinforced the Romans’ xenophobia towards their northern neighbors.
It reinforced what the Roman people expected, which “was what conventional wisdom about
northern barbarians had led them to expect.” 202 When compared to the writings of Caesar, we
see the transition in the Roman mind that has taken place. The Gauls have been defeated; it is
the Germans who are the new Northern threat.
Whether Tacitus was deliberately trying to convince Trajan to attack the Germanic tribes,
we do know that Trajan campaigned in Dacia. It is completely reasonable to assume that
Tacitus, recognizing Trajan’s military acumen and seeing the future emperor inspecting the
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Rhine, was trying to win favor by discussing the situation along the Rhine and Danube. The
Dacians situated across the Danube were not likely the group Tacitus had in mind (he does not
mention them). Trajan did, however, institute a return to Roman offensive expansion, and was
the opposite of Domitian, for whom Tacitus certainly had no love.
While Tacitus’ writings would have been enjoyed by the elite, the average Roman would
have been more familiar with the Arch of Tiberius mentioned by Tacitus. 203 Construction on the
arch finished in 16 C.E. and was built to celebrate the return of two out of the three eagles lost by
the Legions at the Teutoburg Forest in 9 C.E. 204 While the lost arch bears the name of Tiberius,
Tacitus clearly places the victory at the feet of Germanicus, stating the recapture was
accomplished “under the leadership of Germanicus and the auspices of Tiberius.” 205 Germanicus
would celebrate a triumph at the arch, the last non-emperor to do so, but the arch would represent
a symbol of power and victory over the Germanic barbarians in the north present for all Romans
to see. These victory monuments represented newsreels and highlights of victorious campaigns
for the Roman citizenry, and many (although unfortunately not the Tiberius Arch) are still
standing today. They would also be instrumental in reinforcing the xenophobic world view of
the barbarians, as Roman citizens would constantly be reminded of their victories over lesser
people.
Later in the empire, we see Cassius Dio characterizing the Germanic barbarians using
similar patterns. When describing the wars of Marcus Aurelius, he cites many aspects that make
them uncivilized. He comments on the number of women wearing armor among the dead
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barbarians 206 and discusses a number of them being led by a twelve-year-old boy. 207 He points
to their inefficient tactics, which tire them out and cause defeat, despite their larger numbers. 208
We see a clear continuation of the dislike for Rome’s northern neighbors. The severity of the
Marcomannic wars would cause Ammianus to compare the events of Adrianople to the
difficulties suffered by Marcus Aurelius. 209
The sheer amount of bias involved in the accounts of the various tribes are also part of
the problem. Rohrbacher points out that, to any observer, the prevalence of barbarians within
and without the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity provides its most striking feature. 210
Barbarians are prevalent in the ancient sources that remain, and by Late Antiquity they had
expanded to represent all those who were non-Roman. The various tribes placed under this
description, however, have no voice. We rely on the biased version of Roman events and
archeological discovery to give barbarians a voice. Meanwhile, the influence of the Romans,
even today, represents a resilient cultural attachment. As Beard puts it, “Rome still helps to
define the way we understand our world and think about ourselves.” 211
For the public, the column of Marcus Aurelius [figure 5] would have been the main
source of information on the Marcomannic Wars (166-180 C.E.). Built in a similar fashion to
the earlier Trajan’s Column (celebrating Trajan’s victories in Dacia in 101-102 C.E. and 105-106
C.E.), it provided the public visual storytelling similar to the afore mentioned Arch of Tiberius,
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detailing the campaigns and victories of Marcus’ war in the north. Scenes of destruction,
depopulation, battle, the abduction and maltreatment of barbarians are prevalent throughout the
column. 212 These grisly scenes are designed to reinforce to the populace the power of Rome.
The corpses lying on the ground, men being judged, victory in battle are all intended to show the
futility of resistance to Rome. 213
The monument glorified the emperor and his legions, but it also glorified the citizenry
themselves. The column would show Rome’s domination of the barbarian, and they could find
their place, as Romans, in that dominion, reinforcing a sense of superiority. Victory over the
barbarians depicted in Marcus’ column echoed the victory of Trajan’s column. Nearly a century
after Trajan’s wars, Rome is still victorious over the barbarians.

Figure 5: Column of Marcus Aurelius. 214
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Another powerful image of Rome’s ability to deal with the barbarians is seen on a number
of battle sarcophagi, such as the Ludovisi Battle sarcophagus. These sarcophagi were inspired by
the battle reliefs on the column of Marcus Aurelius. 215 Such imitation would imply the powerful
effect the column had, as wealthier Romans tried to reproduce its effects. On the lid of the
sarcophagus is another powerful image, that of the non-Roman children being handed to the
victorious general. This image symbolized Rome’s paternalistic view of themselves over the
barbarian (similar to the image of barbarians being led away from their hut discussed in chapter
one). The additional fact that it is a barbarian man (not a woman) handing over the child, indicates
the submission to Rome’s political authority by the conquered. 216
When it was Rome who had ceded political power, we see an account by Gregory of Tours
(538-594 C.E.) a bishop who wrote several books discussing the situation of Europe following the
end of Roman dominion. His best-known work is called the Histories or more commonly the
Historia Francorum (History of the Franks). The book takes the Roman model of tracing their
history to the founding of Rome and adds a religious dimension to it. Gregory begins his account
with Adam and Eve, which would become common for Christian histories.
The important aspect here is the discussion on the new barbarian kings. While he is less
critical of the Frankish leaders (it is called History of the Franks), he does have harsh descriptions
of the various other tribes dispersed throughout Europe. Book II begins with the Vandals moving
through Gaul into Spain. Upon their arrival, they attempt to force a wealthy Christian to recant
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her beliefs and to be re-baptized under the Arian banner. 217 She refuses, and Gregory describes
the torture she was put through by her Vandal masters. 218
The following three chapters follow a similar discourse. Chapter three discusses further
attacks on Catholics by the Vandals in Africa. Chapter four discusses the similarity of the Gothic
king Athanaric in his persecution of Catholics, and chapter five discusses the Huns in similar terms.
While modern historians question the accuracy of labeling the period the “Dark Ages,” it
is clear that to Gregory it was very real. His belief system was being attacked by these new
barbarian kings. The light of Rome no longer burned bright as a protection; it was now only embers
— only a memory of a golden age now over. As Goffart says, “He certifies to modern men that
the Dark Ages were, at least for the moment, authentically dark.” 219
Gregory recognizes the variation between tribes. His bias is in favor of the Frankish
people, and more importantly, the doctrine of the Catholic Church, but each of these groups is
separated out. For the Vandals, the Goths, and the Franks, this is now their time. They are
expanding beyond their ancient borders and establishing new kingdoms. More important than
these tribes’ heritages or ancestral homelands to Gregory, however, were their views on religion.
The Roman Catholic Church and her clergy became the dominating feature of medieval
Europe, and the writings of a prominent priest would carry significant weight. Gregory would be
sanctified for his contributions to the church. If an opposing barbarian voice existed to argue for

The Arian belief system had been a thorn in the Church’s side for some time. The disagreement centered around
whether Christ was divine or human. The purpose of the Council of Nicaea had been to put an end to Arianism.
Despite Constantine’s support, his successors would go back and forth on which brand of Christianity to follow.
Many barbarian tribes also took to the Arian belief system. For more, see Eusebius. The Life of the Blessed Emperor
Constantine. London: Aeterna Press, 2014. Book III.
218
Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks (New York City: Fordham University, 2016). Sourcebooks.fordham.edu
.2.2
219
Goffart, Barbarian Tides. 231.
217

73

their world view, it would have been squashed, as the Universal Church’s hold on Europe
became tighter. Gregory’s account, no doubt real to his own experience, would give credibility
to the evil barbarian legend. Goffart says, “This idea of early medieval gloom resulting from
Rome’s fall,” shows no sign of losing its appeal, and Gregory still, “stars as witness” for this
interpretation. 220
Gregory is still revered in modern times. He has been called the Herodotus of his time,
and his history, according to Buchner “rank among the most indispensable sources of our
European development.” 221 The myth would have been continued by the sheer weight of its
author’s clout. What learned medieval scholar would question the ferocity of the Vandals when
St. Gregory had so clearly put their savagery on display? Recognizing the Vandals or the Goths
in other ancient sources would have reaffirmed the Roman world view of their barbarity.
As the Medieval period continues, many of the great figures of the period would continue
to define themselves by the spectre of Rome. The memory of the empire remainained crucial to
the validation of power and authority. Charlemagne, with some possible reluctance, was named
Emperor of the Romans in 800 C.E., by the Pope in Rome. 222 Despite being a Frankish King,
the title gave weight to his position, and was understood as being something beyond typical
kingship. Likewise, Otto I was named the first Holy Roman Emperor due to the weight such a
title granted. Ladner gives three reasons for the decision to outline Otto’s rule in the terms of
ancient Rome: the first revolved around the strength and importance of the religious context now
associated with Rome, second having an ordained Roman Emperor countered the claim of the
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Byzantine Emperors to the rights of universal rule over the territory belonging to the Ancient
Empire, and finally it was rooted in the Carolingian concept of the emperor being the protector
of the Roman Church. 223 Despite Medieval Europe being a very different world to that of
Ancient Rome, the memory of Rome remained relevant, and that memory would be contorted to
fit the present need.
Early Modern Period

As we move into the Early Modern Period, there are innumerable volumes that can be discussed
and debated. The majority of ancient sources have been lost, and those of medieval scholars tended
to focus on religion. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, however, the rise of the Italian
humanists saw a revived interest in the works of classical authors. Ancient Greece and Rome were
once again a major area of study. This period coincided with many of the philosophies and ideas
that would evolve into today’s culture.
The period is often referred to as the Renaissance (or “rebirth”), because the period saw a
large interest in and investment into classical literature and style, a rebirth of classical learning.
While the movement began in Italy, by the fifteenth century a number of “wandering poets” began
to cross north into German lands, and spread the ideas of the Italian humanists. 224 By the end of
the century, humanism and an emphasis on classical learning had taken root in Germany, with
every German university containing humanist instructors, as well as many smaller local schools. 225
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The revival of classical learning, brought up the issue of connecting one’s population to the ancient
past.
One of the growing ideas of the Early Modern Period was the importance of identity and
belonging. As Axer says, “For the people of this time the point was to define one’s place in the
world history,” and “include local states and peoples on the map of ancient Mediterranean spacetime… consolidating their internal integration and international position.” 226 Throughout the Early
Modern period, many of the nation-states we know today began defining and consolidating their
borders, and the people within them began to view themselves along national lines. Germany, for
a number of reasons, was delayed in their implementation of this concept (although not for lack of
trying, or of an early start).
While the Italian humanists were tying themselves to their Roman past, the Germans had
more difficulty in defining their past. Germans began reaching for a connection to an ancient
Germanic past. Jakob Wimpheling’s Germania (1501) and Epitome rerum Germanicarum (1505),
for instance, argued for a consistent history of Germany. Germania posited that Alsace had been
inhabited by Germans for centuries and therefore was German, not French, while Epitome rerum
Germanicarum was a flawed attempt at arguing for an ancient and continuous German history. 227
The sixteenth-century state of Germany was a loosely connected but largely divided
grouping of principalities that carried the title of the Holy Roman Empire. The Medieval kingdom
established by Charlemagne lasted until its final dissolution by Napoleon after his victorious
campaign of Austerlitz. At its zenith the empire incorporated the majority of Central Europe, as
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well as parts of France and Italy. But it had never been a very stable kingdom, changing borders
often and with a number of powerful princes that the emperor, more often than not, could not
control. Part of this was the lack of connectivity to a Roman past (at least in the sense of an
accepted role in that past). Fleming points out the struggle in the relationship with Germany and
Rome stating, “No German could, of course, claim to be a ‘citizen of Rome’…and Germany had
no such smooth relationship with the classical past.” 228
While Germans may not have been able to call themselves a citizen of Rome, this was not
always a negative. In many humanists, Rome inspired reverence. The ancient Germans held off
the empire, and maintained their liberty. Krebs says, “German humanists took great and oftrepeated pride that the rule of Germanic people had always been free from any outside rule.”229
The problem in this approach was that by embracing the ancient Germanic myth, that the Early
Modern Germans were claiming to be the continuers of the ancient Germanic people, they not only
perpetuated the barbarian legend, but also set themselves up as a people apart from the Europe that
was tied to Rome.
While early modern Germans were trying to embrace a Germanic past as a positive, others
were reminding the world of the negative aspects of the connection. For example, the naming of
Gothic architecture. Famously, Giorgio Vasari stated the style was, “monstrous and barbarous,
and lacking everything that can be called order.” 230 Considered the first art historian, Vasari is
notably one of the first individuals who recorded his observations on art, architecture, and style.
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Once again, we see a highly influential voice tearing down something he considered “German”
and relating it to barbarism. He echoes the tone and theme seen so many times already. After
voicing his disdain, he goes on to say that “the manner was invented by the Goths,” after “they
had ruined the ancient buildings, and killed the architects in the wars” 231 (hence, the genesis of
the term “Gothic architecture”). It was a style sneered at by Italian artists, who still bristled one
thousand years later over the Germans who had felled Rome. 232 It makes sense that individuals
like Vasari, who praised the Greco-Roman past, would look down on anything to do with the
“barbarians” who destroyed the beloved golden age. Vasari’s view reinforces an adversarial
relationship with a style he views as Germanic, continuing the narrative of Roman and barbaric
hostility.
As renewed interest in classical literature and deference to classical thought took root, we
see the spread of humanism throughout Europe. By focusing on classical sources, the humanists
stirred change within the academic community. As the influence of humanism faded, we can see
similar themes in the Enlightenment, which grew out of the expanded education system produced
by the humanists. The Enlightenment presented new ideas, not necessarily derivatives of classical
motifs, but in many ways inspired by them. In 1748, for example, Montesquieu delivered De
l’espirit des lois, a political treatise arguing against absolutism and for increased civil liberties.
Here he embraced the idea of the ancient Germans. He praised their institutions and love of
freedom, congratulating the modern Germans on “their forbears on having fought off military
forces and foreign words.” 233 The work, unsurprisingly, was praised as a masterpiece in Germany,
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and incited a number of debates on the idea of German nationalism and identity. In 1767, Nicholas
Vazsonyi noted that no other works were as widely known in Germany, as those that addressed
the question of the German national spirit. 234
While Germany was debating national identity, in England Edward Gibbon was working
on his sweeping epic The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. For better or
worse, Gibbon is responsible for the modern perception of the Fall of Rome. He said, “the vigor
of the military government was relaxed and finally dissolved by the partial institutions of
Constantine; and the Roman world was overwhelmed by a deluge of Barbarians.” 235 His sixvolume work traced the Roman Empire from Augustus to the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the
Ottomans in the fifteenth century. Well researched and expertly crafted, it has survived to the
present day as a seminal work on the empire. Like all histories, however, it was a product of the
author’s age.
For Gibbon, the Germans were a connected and militaristic people. He introduced them as
“the warlike Germans, who first resisted, then invaded and at length overturned, the western
monarchy of Rome.” 236 He also said ancient Germany represented over a third of Europe, and
“were peopled by the various tribes of one great nation.” 237 He said their ignorance rendered them,
“incapable of conceiving or embracing the useful restraints of laws,” and their primary desire was
war. 238 He said, “All agreed that a life spent in arms, and a glorious death in battle, were the best
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preparations for a happy futurity either in this or in another world.” 239 Gibbon’s explanation of
the ancient German is largely inspired and sourced from the ancient writers previously discussed.
The majority of Gibbon’s citations in chapter nine are either Tacitus Germania or Caesar’s Gallic
Wars. 240
While Gibbon placed blame for Rome’s fall on his version of the Germans, the conversion
to Christianity played as large a part in the fall of the West as the barbarian tribes did. He
contrasted the warlike Germans with more pacified Romans, neutered by their conversion to
Christianity. He said, “We may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at least
the abuse, of Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.” 241 He
continued, “The attention of the emperors was diverted from camps to synods.” 242 The effects of
the Reformation and the Enlightenment are clearly felt in his writing. Christianity may or may not
be one of the many factors in the fall, but he counters his own argument by noting that many of
the barbarian tribes also converted, which blunted their use of force against the Romans. 243
Gibbon felt that the death of the Romans’ martial spirit led to their defeat, and that this
spirit was killed by the Church. 244 This perspective fails to explain the wars against the East under
Julian 245 or the planned campaigns of Valens, in addition to the ability to defeat the Huns at the
battle of the Catalaunian Plains or the continued spirit shown by Justinian as he campaigned to
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reunite the Empire. The lack of wars to fight or the valor of the legions is not a reasonable analysis
of the final century of the Empire. How those wars were managed, and how the conquered or the
willing allies were treated, is far more the issue from a military sense.
Gibbon’s evaluation echoes the voice of many who have bemoaned a more respectable
time or sought a return to a golden age. When we consider that Gibbon was writing at the end of
the Enlightenment, as Great Britain was emerging as one of the world’s major players, his story is
better understood.

His first volume was published the year the United States declared

independence, and his final volume was published in the same year the French Revolution
exploded onto the scene. Many of Gibbon’s themes would be similar to those pressed by the third
estate against Louis XVI, including corruption by the nobility, failure of leadership, and distrust
of the clergy.
To this day, however, no student of Late Antiquity can fail to reference Gibbon. It is hard
to imagine that any modern historian, including the well-regarded scholars in this work, could have
his reach. Sadly, this means that Gibbon’s interpretation of events will endure, including his ideas
about the barbarian horde and the dampening of the martial spirit. 246 This will not come as a shock
to historians, but it represents a true issue of popular memory. A nearly three-hundred-year-old
work of history remains the most accessible to the public.

246
Anecdotally, when visiting Barnes and Noble to see if Halsall’s Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376568 was in stock for this work, there were four copies of Gibbon and none of Halsall. The only other work on the
shelf dealing with the fall of the West was Peter Heather’s The Fall of the Roman Empire.

81

The Modern Period

In 1789, what was designed to be a meeting of France’s Estates General to solve Louis XVI’s debt
crisis, exploded into the French Revolution. The epoch designates the transition from the Early
Modern to Modern periods.

The revolution saw an explosion of popular movements, and

attempted enlightenment ideas. One of the early revolutionaries was the Abbe Henri Grégoire.
Grégoire was an early defector from the first estate, member of the Jacobin club, and is represented
in Jacques-Louis David’s famous drawing The Tennis Court Oath.247
As the revolution took a number of turns toward radicalism, however, Grégoire became
disheartened with the attempts to de-Christianize France. The Revolutionary mobs destroyed
statues of saints, damaged churches, and made every effort to demolish the sacred symbols they
related with the ancient regime. 248 After the fall of Robespierre and the return of a more moderate
government, Grégoire was asked to write a report in 1794 on the damage the de-Christianization
attempts had caused. In his report, Grégoire related the damage to the ancient Vandals and coined
the term vandalisme or vandalism. 249 The modern definition of vandal is “a person who willfully
mars or destroys property.” 250 The other definition describes the Germanic people who sacked
Rome in 455 C.E., apparently their defining feature.
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Around the same time that Grégoire was writing his report, a young Corsican officer was
making a name for himself in the French Army. Napoleon Bonaparte rose to prominence during
the revolution, and went on to rule much of Europe and the First French Empire. The Napoleonic
Wars that followed Bonaparte’s rise, included a number of military campaigns and political shifts
in the various Germanic principalities. French control caused an increase in the nationalistic
interest, and the period helped shape Germany’s quest for an identity in the nineteenth century.
German novels from 1815-1830 saw an abundance of attempts to cope with three important
developments within the culture: the redrawing of borders, national resistance to foreign invaders,
and continual demands for German unity. 251
Like German national identity, the reaction to Napoleon was hard to pin down. While the
French Emperor was in power, he was hated. After being deposed, he was praised. The emperor,
who had been termed variously the Incarnation of Evil, the Prince of Hell, and the Scourge of God,
was increasingly seen as a tragic symbol of their lost liberty. 252 In whatever way the German
people remembered their time under Napoleon, the desire for unity and a driving force of
nationalism was awakened within the country. 253
As the desire for a German nation and identity expanded, the German people began looking
into the past for their heroes. After a humiliating defeat in 1807, the Bavarian Prince Ludwig I
decided to build a grand monument to celebrate German-speaking heroes of the past, which he
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hoped would stand as an inspiration to the nation. 254 After taking the throne of Bavaria, Ludwig
began building the monument.
The Walhalla monument, named after the Norse myth (despite the Greek-inspired
architecture), the building contains sixty-five plaques and one hundred and thirty busts. Included
as Germanic heroes to be honored are Arminius, the victor of the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest;
Fritigern, the victor of the Adrianople; Alaric I, the Visigothic King who sacked Rome; Odoacer,
the barbarian king who deposed Romulus Augustus (and gives us our 476 C.E. date for the end of
the Roman West); and Clovis I, King of the Franks and the founder of the Merovingian dynasty.
They stand alongside medieval and modern German heroes like Holy Roman Emperor Frederick
I, Ludwig van Beethoven, and Otto von Bismarck.
This German pantheon critically represents why the barbarian myth prevails over modern
scholarship. How can a historian’s argument compete with its imposing architecture? Fritigern is
on a plaque in the same building where busts of Beethoven, Einstein and Frederick the Great reside.
It also indicates the fact that there is no side of the argument (other than the lonely voice of the
historian) that disputes the German nature of these individuals. Germany, in the period it was
working to unify the nation, was calling back to the Germanic heroes of the past. Among those
were the barbarian kings.
The nineteenth century also saw the rise of one of the greatest German composers, Richard
Wagner. Wagner was the cultural embodiment of German romantic idealism. As Nicholas
Vazsonyi wrote, “Whichever way one approaches the issue, the connection between Wagner and
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things German is inescapable.” 255 Many of his operas revolved around ancient German and Norse
mythology. These include arguably his most famous work, Der Ring des Nibelungen, a cycle of
four operas romanticizing the myths of the past.
Frederick Nietzsche, a contemporary of Wagner, was also very active at this time.
Nietzsche compares Tacitus to Thucydides, as representing a Roman author whom he appears to
admire. 256 He describes him as writing in the style of immortality. 257 Is it any wonder why a
German nationalistic movement such as National Socialism was completely enamored with
Germania? Every social force that surrounded them drove them to understand this as their past.
Their operas were filled with Germanic heroes, while their monuments honored the barbarian
leaders of the past.
It is easy to understand, with so many centuries of Germans being snubbed, why their push
for a nation was so strong in the nineteenth century. It is for this very purpose that the Monumenta
Germaniae Historica (MGH) was started. The MGH was designed to collect all things German,
and the first volume was published in 1826. With hundreds of thousands of sources, this has
become a generational project collecting all things German.
This brings us full circle to the twentieth century. The National Socialist party had a
particular obsession with tying the modern German people to the ancient Germanic Barbarians.
There was, as Krebs puts it, “an actual attempt” by Himmler and the S.S. “to turn the Roman’s
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description into German reality, the past into the future, Deutsche into Germanen.” 258 Looking
at the area Hitler claimed to have German ancestry, it roughly equates to the borders of Greater
Germany, or Barbaricum, of the Roman world.
The defeat of the Nazi’s in World War II did not stop the barbarian myth. New forms of
media in the twentieth century like film and interactive media continued to present the barbarian
in ways that reflect the themes present in earlier centuries. For example, the computer game Age
of Empires II (1999) is a real time strategy simulator allowing an individual to choose a
civilization and build it from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period. Within the game
options, there are short semi-historical descriptions of each civilization, and the Goths are
described as brining Rome to its knees and bringing destruction with them as they traveled
throughout Europe. 259 In the game itself, the Goths are presented as having only one chance of
survival, create an unstoppable horde. The civilization is purposely hindered from creating
defense structures, and is forced to create infantry units which are given bonuses that make them
cheap and quick to make simulating an unstoppable horde.
In the 2000 film, Gladiator, Ridley Scott presents the German barbarians during the
wars of Marcus Aurelius. In a scene taken straight from Tacitus, the fur clad barbarians make a
stand against the Roman army. They are presented as savages after killing the Roman messenger
and carrying his head to the battlefield. Only the protagonist of the film, Maximus, shows an
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emotion other than contempt for the tribes in a moment of foreshadowing when he recognizes
that he would also continue to fight if facing similar odds. 260
Older forms of media continue to perpetuate the myth as well. In 2012, Robert Reich
penned an article for Business Insider titled, “The Barbarians Are at the Gates of
Washington.” 261 Reich’s article harnesses the imagery of the barbarian at the gates to warn of
the potential disaster of the Republican party’s influence. He concludes with, “Washington can
already sense the barbarians at the gates.” 262 While the imagery is powerful, he fails to correctly
present the analogy. He relates Rome to Washington, but he calls the barbarians (in his analogy
the Republicans) anti-immigrant natives. While this may or may not be an accurate description
of any given Republican politician, what Reich fails to recognize is that Rome would have been
the anti-immigrant natives in his analogy.
This is the real problem, the barbarian image can represent the other, any other, that does
not fit into the artists, writer, or journalist’s worldview. The Germanic barbarians of Late
Antiquity’s image has been cemented, with the exception of a few scholars who work on the
period, no real dispute on the barbaric nature of these ancient “Germans” exists. The Romans
clearly established the Germans as the Empire’s boogeymen. The fall of Rome was placed at
their feet. Early modern philosophers, writers and artists accepted the German nature as fact, and
even the German people themselves embraced the barbarian past as their own. A past that is
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now being perpetuated in film, art, interactive media, and politics. With no real dissent from the
myth, there is no wonder why it continues.
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CONCLUSION

The goal of this argument was first to introduce one of the most studied Germanic tribes during
the period surrounding the catastrophic Roman defeat of Adrianople. The various barbaric
people traded with the Roman Empire, fought in their armies, relied on their wealth, and even
saw Rome as a protector. By focusing on the Goths around the time of Adrianople, we see Rome
on the precipice of disaster, yet there are no real signs that a fall is coming.
Rome was pursing wars in the east and troubles in Egypt, and the request of aid by the
Goths was seen at the time as a good thing. The event even echoed the southern push of the
Goths that led to the Marcomannic Wars, so it was not a new event for the Romans. The
subsequent complete mishandling and mistreatment of those willing to provide the e
mpire with the resources they needed shows that the Romans were at least as involved in their
own defeat as the Goths were.
Following the discussion of Adrianople, it was shown that Rome never truly recovered.
Despite claims that Theodosius put the empire back on track, the reality was that he was in
constant warfare with either the Goths or Roman rebels. He may have survived the rebellions
and ended the Gothic War, but the Rome that came out on the other side was a straw house,
waiting for a big bad wolf to blow it down. Instead of consolidating his new allies into the
empire, Theodosius was forced to face two
That discussion expanded into a broader look at the memory of the barbarians throughout
Western civilization. Adrianople is remembered as a disastrous defeat, comparable to that of
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Cannae or Teutoburg Forest, yet far fewer remember forcing Gothic families to sell their
children into slavery for food. The subsequent sackings of Rome are remembered, but the killing
of legionnaires’ families for their supposed Germanic heritage is not as commonly spoken of. As
time progressed, those who glorified Rome chose to champion its triumphs and look past its
failures.
Each major historical epoch since the Fall of Rome has pushed forward this concept of
Germanic barbarism, whether it was Church fathers like Gregory, writing down in detail the
malicious acts of the new barbaric kings that brought on a dark age, or humanists like Giorgio
Vasari, who criticized the ugly German style. The story has been so engrained that even modern
language reflects this past. t is a delicate line to walk. The various tribes certainly had a hand in
Rome’s downfall. There can be no doubt that Valen’s army was destroyed at Adrianople, that
Alaric sacked Rome in 410 C.E., or that after the Western Empire had truly fallen it was the
Franks, Vandals, Goths, et al. that benefited most. But as Adrian Goldsworthy says, “In the end,
it may well have been ‘murdered’ by barbarian invaders, but these struck at a body made
vulnerable by prolonged decay.” 263
It was not one event, but many. Militarily, it was not just the Goths: it was the Franks
moving into Gaul, the Sassanid Empire to the East, or the Huns. Economically, it was paying
barbarian chiefs for peace and refitting armies after losses on the various frontiers, while having
to provide for a population that for centuries had relied on the Roman government for
subsistence. It was all these things and more. Rome at the end of the fourth century was the
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cartoon character that had more leaks than it had fingers and toes to plug the holes. By the fifth
century, those holes had ruptured the dam, and recovery was impossible.
With all of these events happening simultaneously, only a bias against the barbarians
could explain the continuation of the barbarian legend. Rome has often been glorified, perhaps
more than any Empire or governmental system of the past. Therefore, history is full of people
who want to think the best of their Rome, and who fail to analyze or internalize its weaknesses.
As the United States government debates about how to handle its southern border, and Europe
decides how to deal with recent arrivals from the war-torn Middle East, similar events are being
played out. If history is good at one thing, it is showing those who read it the paths that do not
work. Perhaps the Roman dealings with its northern neighbors can help enlighten those in power
today to take a different path.
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